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Abstract 
International retirement migration (IRM) is a growing and significant feature 
of the European Union. It has important economic implications in terms of the 
redistribution of social costs, factors reward and incomes. Using overlapping gener- 
ations models and simulation techniques this thesis focuses on the economic effects 
of International Retirement Migration (IRM) within the European Union (EU). 
Three main parts make up this thesis. 
The first part summaries the legal and the social framework within the Euro- 
pean Union where IRM takes place. Access to European welfare system is based 
on the principle of non-discrimination. However, the European Comunity law reg- 
ulates the possibility of free riding through the resource requirement. 
In the second part, after a brief literature review in social security, the thesis 
develops a quantitative model that tries to explain some reasons why IRM may take 
place. Starting with a difference between "environment" of European countries, 
some people may opt for a better life in another country when they retire. We also 
focus on the capital accumulation effect for home and host countries. 
The presence of large populations of retired foreign residents in European coun- 
tries raises fundamental questions with respect to the right of access to health and 
welfare services. In the third part, bearing in mind the principle of free movement 
of capital and the non-discrimination principle in accessing public service within 
the EU, we focus on the economic effects of IRM for the host country, for the 
individual migrants themselves, for the host communities and for public policy. 
CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
1. The problem of old age 
All European Union member states are or have been engaged in reforms de- 
signed to contain or reduce the future cost of public pension provision. Several 
factors have contributed towards this'. 
A fall in birth rates and an increase in life expectancy mean considerable 
changes in the age structure of Europe's population, with significant increases 
in the number of people aged 65 plus and 80 plus forecast in the next 30 years. 
This situation has been viewed by the EU as problematic because it represents a 
challenge to the feasibility of established national welfare systems. 
Another relevant development has been a shift in policy with regards to early 
retirement. There has been an increase in the number of people aged 50 plus who 
are no longer active in the paid labour market. In fact, many European countries 
actively encourage early retirement despite the general health and life expectancy 
of these individuals being much greater. In the recent years this approach has been 
reversed with member states now being urged by the Commission to raise official 
retirement ages and discourage early exit from paid employment. Table 1 shows 
'OECD, 2000 
1 
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Country Greece Italy Portugal UK Ireland 
Year 1960 2030 1960 2030 1960 2030 1960 2030 1960 2030 
Life expect 
at birth 
Male 68 78 67 79 61 77 68 78 68 79 
Female 71 84 72 84 67 83 74 83 72 84 
Perc. of 
population 
aged 65+ 8 25 10 30 8 23 12 23 11 18 
aged 80+ 1 7 1 8 16 2 6 2 5 
'TABLE 1. rrojectea aemograpmc trencis in six member states 
the old age dependency ratio, comparing people aged 16-64 with those aged 65 
plus2. 
1.1. EU and International Retirement Migration (IRM). Many changes 
have taken place in western European society which have contributed to the way 
many of us experience old age and retirement3. Income improvements, increased 
educational opportunities and changes in the job market (e. g. increase of profes- 
sional rather than manual jobs) have all had an impact upon the aspirations and 
2Figures from OECD (2000) 
3for example, Laslett, 1989; Warnes, 1993. 
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Country Greece Italy Portugal UK Ireland 
Year 2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030 
Male 23 33 33 27 39 39 38 34 38 34 
Female 21 32 19 27 39 33 32 38 24 38 
Old age 
Dependency 
Ratio 
2 1.5 21 32 32 3.5 2.5 
TABLE 2. Litetime years spent in work 
choices available to people in later life. Overseas travel, longer holidays and early 
retirement options have increasingly become a feature of many peoples lives in re- 
cent decades. This said, old age is not always characterised by positive experience 
and many people still experience poverty, lack of opportunities and debilitating 
illness. The argument is, however, that in contemporary Europe we can now dif- 
ferentiate between a `third age' of "well resourced and healthy retirement" and 
a `fourth age' of later life starting in the late seventies in which the onset of old 
age-related illness and need for care become important considerations (cf Laslett, 
1989). 4 
When discussing the movement of retired people abroad, most of the literature 
defines this phenomenon as "International Retirement Migration" (IRM). Much 
4See Warnes, 1993, p 451 
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of existing literature has focused on the relocation of UK pensioners towards the 
warmer regions of southern Europe5. 
From a statistical point of view, it appears that an accurate picture cannot be 
painted with regards to IRM. There is little other statistical data available and 
most of it is unreliable6. 
The problems can be seen in Table 37. A number of countries fail to differentiate 
by age at all, and, whilst the figures give an indication of the number of older EU 
nationals officially resident in another member state, there is no way of assessing 
how many of them moved following retirement. In addition, the figures do not 
record those who have failed to inform the official authority of their permanent 
relocation. O'Reilly's comment (made in relation to British retirees relocating to 
Spain) that, "existing statistics are both difficult to obtain and to trust because of 
the fluidity, undocumented and unofficial nature of this form of migration" (2000b, 
p 481) holds true when considering IRM across the whole of Europe. 
5see for example, Williams et al, 1997; King et al, 2000; O'Reilly, 1999. 
6see William et al, 1997; O'Reilly, 1999; Warners 1999. 
7Source: Figure adapted from Eurostat, 1999. 
'Numbers differetiated by age not available. 
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Age 
Country 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 
Austria 3,900 2,900 1,900 6,600 
Belgium 11,441 33,373 29,563 71,807 
Denmark 4,078 2,974 1,709 2,582 
Finland 656 513 434 1,586 
France 99,729 88,973 73,642 58,622 
Germany 1,850,032' 
Greece 3,344 2,301 1,391 2,573 
Italy 133,512° 
Ireland Non Available 
Luxemburg 131,4104 
Netherlands 14,066 10,971 6,542 11,077 
Portugal Non Available 
Spain 219,790° 
Sweden 18,163 12,893 8,875 13,782 
UK , 65,000 66,100 56,400 137,900 
TABLE 3. Number of EU national resident in anot ember state, 
by age 
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2. Motivations to migration: an overview 
Generally, according to Williams et al (1997), there are several motivating 
factors for people to relocate on retirement, which could be assembled into five 
loose clusters8: 
" for work, with work, lower living costs 
" domestic care, proximity to family, marriage effect, loss of partner (divorce, 
separation, bereavement), for children. 
" healthcare services as a factor in initial and, especially, return movements. 
" the wish to be buried `at home', enforced unemployment, retirement plan 
" region appeal, holidays, climate, a desire to return to one's roots/homeland. 
The above five clusters are not mutually exclusive of one another. A combina, - 
tion of different issues and events such as geographical location, age and economic 
and familial relationships are significant in influencing the movements and pre- 
ferred locations of retired EU migrants. Various factors working in combination 
with each other are often the key in migration decision making process. 
Discussing IRM across Europe more specifically, Williams et all (1997) offer 
three main explanations as to why an increasing number of nationals from northern 
European states relocate to southern Europe on retirement. 
a 
8see Williams et al, 1997; King et al, 1998. 
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1. Relocating south is a sensible economic decision because of lower cost of liv- 
ing, heating and cheaper house prices. In addition, certain southern coun- 
tries have more favourable fiscal and tax policies. This, in turn, means 
that northern migrants, who, it is argued are mostly "either retired or 'ac- 
tive young elderly' [sic] persons with above average wealth and incomes" 
(Williams et al, 1997, p 116), can build on and benefit even further from 
their already advantaged economic position. 
2. A warmer climate is an obvious pull for those who wish to escape from the 
colder northern regions of Europe. 
3. Certain retirement movements are brought about by the search for an ide- 
alised middle class myth, characterised by certain lifestyles, cultures and 
landscapes. According to King et all (1998), other influential decisions to 
migrate internationally have included previous holiday visits and prior oc- 
cupations. 
Taking the above issues into account, Williams et al (1997) distinguish be- 
tween discrete groups within a more general category of post-retirement migrants. 
They include seasonal migrants (snowbirds), who relocate for temporary periods 
and have a base in their home country. Another significant classification, lifetime 
expats, consists of people who were previously employed abroad and have expe- 
rienced continuous movement and relocation throughout their working life. This 
group includes the military, international companies or high ranking civil servants. 
Williams et al (1997) label this group `tax dodgers' who on retirement choose 
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southern European locations in order to store their accumulated wealth in offshore 
havens, thus avoiding the higher tax regimes in their northern European countries 
of origin. 
It is important to note that retirement migration is not a simple or quick 
move. It often involves a series of moves, including extended vacations, followed 
by seasonal moves. This is especially true for European Union countries where 
the geographical distances are relatively short. People may retire from their main 
occupation and then take up part-time, voluntary or self-employed work. Indeed, 
such movements into and out of work may become increasingly common in the 
context of the labour market and increasing policy emphasis on the importance 
of delaying retirement and active encouragement of retired people to resume paid 
work. 
In addition to the above factors, the provision of welfare benefits and services 
in different countries should not be overlooked. This is specifically important with 
regard to return migration decisions linked to serious illness or increased frailty in 
old age. 
The geography of retirement migration raises some interesting questions in 
terms of material entitlement: 
1. The movements generally take place at a time when peoples lives are asso- 
ciated with the need for increased dependency in terms of healthcare 
2. MOTIVATIONS TO MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW 9 
2. People move away from generous welfare systems to coastal and rural re- 
gions in southern Europe.. These locations typically lack a comprehensive 
infrastructure of community care and support services. 
3. With the exception of some returnees, the majority of retired migrants are 
also moving away from potential sources of informal care (their families). 
Despite the diversity of national welfare systems, European Community law 
clearly provides an important basis for welfare claims in the host state for 
retirement migrants. 
10 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
3. Organisation of the thesis 
This introduction is followed by three parts that try to analyse three different 
aspects of IRM. 
In the first part (Chapter 2) we look at the European legal aspects of IRM 
and deal with the complex and controversial issues that it brings about. On one 
hand, the European Union is based on non-discriminatory principle with regards 
to the free movement between countries, while at the same time, certain European 
Directives put a resource requirement limit which stops migrants from free riding 
the host country's social security system. 
In the second part after a brief literature review on social security (Chapter 3), 
the thesis develops a quantitative model which explains why IRM may take place 
between two countries, taking into account the environmental variable (Chapter 
4-5). This phenomenon may result in a modified capital accumulation for both 
countries. 
In part three, after a brief technical discussion of the algorithm used to find the 
equilibrium of the simulation model, we analyse the economic effect of social secu- 
rity and IRM through simulation techniques. In Chapter 6, we deal primarily with 
the impact of social security on the economy and then we also analyse the effect of 
social security on savings, labour supply and the welfare of different generations. 
Chapter 7 considers the economic effect of IRM, focusing on two aspects. The 
first one is that international retirement migrants can access free of charge part of 
the social security system of the host country. The second one is that in order to 
3. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 11 
support themselves, the migrants need to bring a certain amount of savings with 
them to the host country. 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis findings and suggestion for further 
studies. 
The simulation results should not be mistaken for empirical estimates, which 
they are not. Simulation analysis is certainly no substitute for empirical research. 
Rather, it provides a method of exploring the full implications of economic relations 
and empirical findings. 
Matlab encoding of the numerical simulation models are included in the ap- 
pendices. 
Part 1 
Legal Framework 
CHAPTER 2 
The legal Status of Retirement Migrants 
1. The legal status of retired migrants 
1.1. Citizenship of the Union and Mobility rights. At the present, Citi- 
zenship of the Union, is on a national basis and applies to all those persons resident 
within the EU who are nationals of one of the EU member states. In the context 
of EU, the development of citizenship since the Treaty of Rome has taken place 
in close connection to the evolution of mobility rights. This relationship between 
mobility and citizenship was given formal constitutional recognition in the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) with the insertion of a Article declaring the existence 
of "Citizenship of the Union". 
1.2. Citizenship of the Union. From the Treaty of the European Union 
we have: 
Article 17 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship 
of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and 
shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby. 
15 
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Article 18 
1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and 
conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it 
effect. 
Article 19 
1 Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a 
national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal 
elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions 
as nationals of that State. 
2...... every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not 
a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections 
to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under 
the same conditions as nationals of that State. 
Article 17 with the rights attached to mobility in Articles 18 and 19 reaffirms the 
close relationship between citizenship and mobility in Community law. Mobility 
is thus not only a right in itself but also constitutes the trigger to other forms of 
social entitlement. 
To the extent that the relationship between citizenship and migration has been 
subject to analysis, it is usually in the context of drawing a distinction between 
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those migrants who hold community nationality and those who do not (in other 
words third country nationals outside EU). 
Article 18 (1) infers a broad equality of status among Community nationals. 
The precise wording, however, suggests some caveats, rendering entitlement "sub- 
ject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect". The full implications of this provision and the extent 
to which the inclusion of Article 18 effectively replaces pre-existing law has not 
yet been resolved. At present residency rights are provided for under a cluster of 
Directives specific to different groups of migrants. 
1.3. Freedom of movements in community law: the provisions . 'Cit- 
izenship of the Union', as Article 17 suggests, does not replace national citizenship 
but rather `complements it'. In that context, formal citizenship status reflects not 
only Community law but also the specific benefits deriving from national citizen- 
ship (which vary considerably between member states, not only in a substantive 
sense but also, importantly, in terms of their transportability). The contribution 
of national citizenship as a fundamental source of social entitlement is of particu- 
lar importance given the diversity of domestic welfare systems and the fact that 
non-discrimination remains the basis of welfare claims in the host stater. 
'Community law, in this context, is not concerned to promote harmonization in the social 
policy field but rather recognizes diversity. 
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Title III of the Treaty establishing the European Community provides for the 
`free movement of persons, services and capital' throughout the Community. Indi- 
viduals who wish to enter, work and reside in another member state can do so on 
the basis of Article 39 EC, which provides that 
Article 39: Freedom of movement of workers shall be secured within the Com- 
munity. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimi- 
nation based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment... 
Article 43 details the freedom of establishment of nationals to include, the right 
to "take up and pursue activities as self employed persons". 
The constitutional right to free movement has been substantiated by secondary 
legislation that enables the migrant worker to overcome certain financial and social 
obstacles, which arise as a result of exercising free movement2. This has been 
achieved through the development of two principal mechanisms: 
1. Regulation 1612/68, implements Articles 39-43 of the 'Meaty and is the 
main source of secondary legislation governing the free movement rights of 
workers. Most significantly, Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68 entitles 
Community migrant workers to the "same social and tax advantages" as 
nationals in the host state. 
2See 
, Steiner, 1994, p 201; O'Leary, S., 1999, p 68 
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2. Regulation 1408/71, on the other hand, seeks to coordinate rather than 
harmonise domestic social security systems. 
1.4. Mobility rights and Post-retirement migrants(PRM). In relation 
to retired EU migrants, there are essentially three different groups 
1. Persons who move to another member state as workers and then retire 
(retired community workers). 
2. Those who move to another member state for work and then return home 
on retirement. (returning community workers). 
3. Persons who retire in the home state and move after retirement. (post- 
retirement migrants). 
Whilst the first two groups have full access to host welfare systems, the third 
group (referred to as post retirement migrants) are effectively caught by the re- 
sources requirement stated in the Council Directive 90/365 in what became known 
as the 'playboy directive'. Even though this Directive extends residency rights to 
those. Community nationals who have ceased their occupational activity in their 
home state and who wish to move to another member state on retirement, it does 
so under one important condition the persons concerned as well as their families: 
... they themselves and the members of their families are covered by sickness 
insurance in respect of all risks in the host Member States and have sufficient 
financial resources to ensure that they will not become a burden on the public 
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purse and social security system of the host Member State during their period 
of residence. 
This `resources requirement' rigorously limits the formal welfare claims that 
this group of retired people can make against the host state. 
1.4.1. The legal status of returnees. The social status of returnees (those people 
who either return home after finishing work in another member state or return 
after spending a period of retirement abroad) is to a large extent a function of 
national law and policy. In recent years, however, the European Court has had to 
consider the legality of certain national laws potentially restricting the social status 
of returnees (on the grounds that their economic contribution has taken place in 
another state). A case in point is the UK's habitual residence test. This test, first 
introduced in 1994, requires that an EU citizen moving to the UK should satisfy 
certain criteria in determining their access to a range of social security benefits3. 
These criteria relate to the number of years the individual has lived outside the UK. 
As such, the habitual residence test operates to withhold benefits to EU citizens 
and returning nationals until residence is considered to have been (re) established. 
2. International retirement migration (I IM) and the importance of 
location 
The EU itself is not a welfare provider, instead it regulates access to domestic 
welfare systems. In order to understand the consequences of a move in retirement, 
3Including Housing Benefit, Income Support, and Council Tax Benefit. 
2. INTERNATIONAL RETIREMENT MIGRATION (IRM) AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATICIN 
we need to specify that the right to freedom of movement is based on a principle 
of non-discrimination rather than social harmonization. 
In the past the European welfare systems have been variously classified in 
relation to a number of criteria by theorists engaged in comparative analysis4. 
I 
Esping-Andersen's (1990) influential study was an attempt to construct a typology 
of welfare states based on the different ways in which they are organised in relation 
to market forces, social structures and political interests. He classified a number 
of states according to three basic "ideal types" of welfare regime: 
" 1) "Liberal/Anglo-Saxon" countries developed their welfare systems against 
a historic backdrop of strong class antagonism. This often resulted in basic 
social welfare schemes reserved for the working class, whilst private and 
occupational welfare was available to the middle class. 
" 2) The "conservative/corporatist" welfare states of continental Europe are 
characterised by strong occupational, contribution based, social insurance 
welfare schemes for paid workers and lower rate social assistance benefits for 
those outside the paid labour market. 
" 3) The "social democratic/Scandinavian" states are distinguished from the 
others by welfare systems based very much on universalistic services, full em- 
ployment and equal opportunity, in which access to welfare is less dependent 
upon activity in the paid labour market. 
For example, Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lewis, 1992; Giarchi, 1996. 
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A fourth category, variously described as a "southern" (Ferrera, 1996) has since 
been added to Esping-Andersen's original classification. The key elements that dis- 
tinguish southern European welfare states have been laid out by Ferrera (1996), 
Katrougalos, 1966, Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000. Typically, southern welfare 
states have a "fragmented income maintenance system: generous retirement ben- 
efits for 'protected categories', but modest benefits for the rest, plus a low social 
pension for those with insufficient contributions" (Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000, 
p 123).. In southern welfare states, the role of informal, family based care, is seen 
as crucial for plugging gaps in formal provision for senior citizens (Symeonidou, 
1996). 
The importance of a basic awareness of the diversity of welfare provision across 
the EU becomes clearer when one understands the legal basis of citizenship en- 
titlement under the free movement provisions and the implications of the non- 
discrimination principle. In other words, location has a major influence on access 
to social welfare. Welfare status thus reflects the wider geography of mobility and 
the welfare mix of both sending and receiving countries. It is also life course sensi- 
tive because social welfare, in the narrow sense of access to services and so on, may 
figure little in the priorities shaping the initial migration decision of both economic 
migrants and retirement migrants. The decision of whether or when to return, on 
the other hand, suggests a much higher concern with access to welfare. 
3. CONCLUSION 
3. Conclusion 
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This chapter has examined the status of retired migrants within the European 
Union. It is apparent that this population is not a'homogenous group, but it 
comprises of a number of subgroups with different legal rights. 
Access to the European welfare system is based on the principle of non-discrimination. 
At the same time, the European Directive regulates the possibility of free rid- 
ing through the resource requirement. This represents an interesting controversy 
for international retirement migration, because, in reality, the movement between 
countries is restricted to those with substantial resources even though in theory 
the free access applies to everyone. These two issues represent an interesting con- 
troversy for international retirement migration. 
This thesis builds upon the above theories to suggest a couple of economics 
models to study the economics effects of IRM.. First of all, the second part will 
discuss a quantitative model which tries to explain the reasons why retired people 
move from one country to another, including the economic effect of IRM with 
regards to capital accumulation and private savings. 
The third part of the thesis goes on to further explore the economics effects of 
IRM on the host country. There are two aspects which will be analysed here. First 
of all, once in the host country and based on the non discrimination principle, 
international retirement migrants can have a free access to parts of the social 
security of that country. Secondly, in order to support their living in the host 
country, these migrants will bring some savings (e. g. with which to buy a house ). 
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The thesis analyses only some aspects of IRM, but leaves some open questions in 
terms of public policy: How to deal with International Retirement Migrants when 
they access public services in the host county? Does IRM need to be restricted 
only to wealthy people that can afford to move to a different country? How to tax 
pension income of migrants who spend most of their time in a different country 
where their pension is paid? 
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Part 2 
International Retirement Migration, 
Social Security a Quantitative Model 
CHAPTER 3 
Introduction and Literature review in Social Security 
1. Introduction 
Social Security systems have played an important role in the economic life of 
European countries. They not only provide security for the elderly, but can also 
fulfill a role of automatic stabilizers. They provide a means of income redistribu- 
tion, as well as impacting upon capital accumulation, and labour supply. 
The essential thrust of economic integration in its various forms, from trade 
liberalization to enhanced labour and capital mobility, can be summarized thus: 
economic integration, while generally welcomed, usually has adverse consequences 
for relatively inefficient producers. The interaction between social security and eco- 
nomic integration then becomes particularly interesting whenever it induces some 
gain or losses between countries. The aim of this part is to provide a theoretical 
investigation in relation to specific aspects of social security systems, using various 
overlapping generation models. The main dimensions of this analysis relate to the 
efficiency of public pensions, in particular their impact upon economic growth in 
the light of the European economic integration. Our aim is to contribute to the 
literature on the economics of social security systems, by considering new elements 
such as mobility of factors of production (capital and labor), and the mobility of 
retired people. 
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During this part of the thesis We are going to consider a simple model of 
resource allocation using a two-country overlapping generation model with free 
migration of workers, and the retired. We assume that the only role played by 
the government is to provide Social Security by a capital reserve system. The 
model defines households characterized by utility functions with the usual formal 
properties. One new element introduced will be that agents, in making their saving 
decisions (for pensions) will also consider an environmental incentive. We will look 
at the determinants of migration choices for workers or pensioners, and examine 
the effects of wages (workers) or different level of environment (pensioners) on these 
choices. Different wage conditions and different environment levels, between the 
two countries will impact upon migration. We will produce a model illustrating 
the implications of both being with or without trade. Some preliminary results 
from this model are discussed in the next chapter of this part. 
The aim of this model is to set the basis for future analysis considering a two- 
country, infinite overlapping generations model with different saving preferences. 
We are going to consider a fully-funded pension system in an overlapping gener- 
ation model a la Diamond'. As we mentioned before, a new element introduced 
will be that agents in making their saving decisions may consider an environmental 
incentive. When they make a saving decision, agents will also consider the value of 
the environment during their retirement period. The value of the environment in 
'Diamond (1965) 
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the next period (retirement) is one argument within the consumers' utility func- 
tion. We assume that the value of the environment is a function of an original 
exogenous endowment of the environment, which is assumed to have an identical 
value across periods in present value terms. The quality value of the environment 
is assumed to be negatively related to the presence of negative externalities and 
hence positively related to the presence of positive externalities. We also assume 
that the value of the environment is a negative function of the expected level of 
capital deployed during the next period. Implicit in this assumption is the view 
that capital investment undermines the sustainability of the environment. We 
assume that individuals ignore the impact of individual decision making on the 
overall level of capital accumulation. In other words, individuals know that their 
action is insignificant compared to environment. They simply maximize their util- 
ity function subject to a budget constraint, disregarding the impact on the overall 
level of capital accumulation. Because the individual can by himself have only a 
minuscule impact upon the overall level of capital accumulation, it is assumed that 
such an impact is disregarded when consumers make their decisions. In effect an 
individual consumer's optimum may lead to a sub-optimal level of capital accu- 
mulation at a social level. [Therefore we are assuming that dynamics implicit in 
learning-by-doing models do not operate. ] 
In chapter 4 we are going to show the effect on saving decisions (and also capital 
accumulation) of the presence of an environmental motive in a closed economy. 
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We will show how saving decisions change if agents consider also the effect of their 
decisions on the environment when they are retired. 
In chapter 5 we are going to consider resource allocation in a model with two 
countries. The model is an overlapping generation model with free migration, 
which is otherwise symmetric except for the assumption of different endowments of 
environmental resources between the two countries, and the impact of the different 
levels of development in the two countries. We will allow individuals (workers and 
the retired) and capital, to migrate freely across national borders. 
2. Literature review on Social Security 
A social security scheme either may rely on pay-as-you-go principles or take 
the form of a capital reserve system. With a pay-as-you-go system (PAYG), the 
younger households' contributions are immediately distributed to the old; with 
a capital reserve system (CR), a capital stock, which is built up for each young 
generation, will be consumed when this generation becomes old. Most Western 
European pension systems are funded on a Pay-as-you-go basis. 
When pension provision is introduced, there is often little consideration and 
knowledge of the effects on macroeconomic variables, and little thought about long 
term sustainability. After the second world war this PAYG approach to providing 
for old age was adopted in most Western European Countries. 
Nowadays, many economists would raise severe concerns about the introduction 
of an old-age security system based upon a Pay-As-You-Go approach. The wide 
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interest in economic theory relating to public pension systems in Europe, came as 
a consequence of three facts: 
1. In no other parts of the world is provision for old-age so predominantly 
provided by the state. 
2. Most Western European Countries have lower fertility rates than the rest of 
the world. Without immigration, their populations will already have substantially 
decreased. 
3. The introduction of the Single Market (1992) and the Euro (2002), have 
increased the degree of economic integration and mobility of factors of production 
between European Countries. 
Following the seminal work of Samuelson (1975), a theoretical literature has 
grown examining the macroeconomic relationships between social security systems, 
aggregate savings and the allocation of resources within an overlapping generations 
framework2. An important aspect of the analysis of the social security system 
involves analysis of the relationship between social security, and dynamic efficiency 
in terms of an optimal capital-labour ratio. This analysis is generally conducted 
within a simple two-sector, two-period overlapping generations (closed) economy 
model with emphasis being placed upon the steady state. In the literature, the 
term efficiency has also been related to the "Golden Rule" concept, which broadly 
defines the optimal level of capital for a dynamic economy as that which maximizes 
the steady state lifetime utility for each generation. 
2The theoretical literature is reviewed by Felder B. (1992) 
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The theory of inefficiency of intergenerational transfers provided by Pay-as-you- 
go schemes is based on two different sets of models. The first set of models assumes 
a "small open economy". In this case the economies are so small in relation to 
the size of the world economy that the market rate of interest is assumed to be 
given. A number of important papers [P. A. Samuelson (1958), H. Aaron (1966), 
K. Spremann (1984), St. Homburg (1990)] use these kind of models. The second set 
of models assumes a "closed economy". The models are based upon a life-cycle 
theory and assume factor prices are determined endogenously. [P. A. Diamond 
(1965) P. A. Samuelson (1975), F. Breyer/M. Straub (1991)] 
It is interesting to note that both groups of hypotheses lead to the same conclu- 
sions in terms of the welfare implications of Pay-as-you-go systems (given that an 
infinite sequence of overlapping generations are assumed): Steady state welfare is 
improved by introducing a system of transfers from younger to older generations, 
so long as the interest rate is lower than the growth rate of the population. That 
is because the rate of return in social security is assumed to be the growth rate of 
the population, rather than the interest rate as in a capital reserve system. 
Samuelson (1975) employs a simple two-sector (private and government) two 
period overlapping generations model, to characterize the optimal steady state 
social security programme. In his work he establishes that a less than fully funded 
state pension scheme can be used to manipulate the level of aggregate saving and 
hence capital accumulation, in the economy, thereby securing attainment of the 
Golden Rule capital-labor ratio, where it would otherwise not prevail. This result 
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arises because the introduction of a social security programme reduces the need 
for individuals to save for their retirement. It can therefore be used to reduce 
aggregate saving to the Golden Rule level. This Pareto improvement can only be 
achieved if the initial state is one of dynamic inefficiency with too much (and not 
too little) capital. 
The Samuelson (1975) paper has provided the foundations for much subsequent 
work, with later authors investigating the impact of relaxing various assumptions. 
Among the most noteworthy of these are: 
1. Presence or absence of "altruism" that can motivate intergenerational trans- 
fers such as gifts and bequests3. 
2. Uncertainty with respect to output 4and length of lifetimes5. 
3. Myopia in the saving decision6. 
4. Inelastic or exogenous supply of labour. 
5. Retirement behavior7. 
6. Public choice voting systems 8 . 
3Barro (1975), Bernheim at al (1984,1985), Feldstein (1988), Abel (1987), and Weil (1987). 
4W. Richter and W. Enders (1982), and HE Lapan. As a starting point in both papers it is 
assumed that there is uncertainty with respect to labour productivity. 
5Sheshinski and Weiss(1981) consider uncertainty with respect to mortality. 
6Feldstein (1985) 
'Danziger (1981) at all, Aaron (1982), Lazear (1986), Hu(1979) 
8Browning (1975) 
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Although these theories have provided a useful insight into various phenomena 
surrounding social security, in the later models we will only focus on the issue of 
retirement behaviour. 
From the above works, it is possible to extract some themes of particular rele- 
vance: 
The presence of some of these factors, such a bequest, uncertainty and 
myopia, may themselves justify the introduction of a compulsory social security 
scheme. 
= Social Security with a Pay as You Go scheme is a substitute for private 
saving; consequently its availability reduces the need to save for retirement. 
Social Security reduces the effective cost of retirement, and may therefore 
encourage earlier retirement. This in turn may induce additional saving to provide 
for the longer than expected periods of retirement. 
Under the assumption of a single majority voting system, the contributions 
to the public pension systems are too large, and such a level generally does not 
converge to the one which maximizes individual utility in the long-run equilibrium. 
Empirically the quantitative effect of the saving rate is still a controversial 
point, because of the impact of several variables9. 
= The introduction of uncertainty seems to confirm the inefficiency of a pay- 
as-you-go scheme. However, research on this type of model is still being carried 
out. 
9Aaron, H. J. (1996) 
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= There is a concentrated discussion on the programs of reform in Western 
Europe. Due to demographic factors, all the Western European countries are 
facing the prospect of higher and higher contribution rates to retain the same 
level of pension-income10. The possible increase in women's employment will offer 
only partial relief. Simulation exercises indicate that in addition to a rise in the 
retirement age, further measures will be necessary. 
'°See Kieran Mc Morrow, Werner Roeger (2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
A model 
1. The basic Model 
We consider an overlapping-generations economy in which individuals live for 
two periods, so that at any point in time, the economy is composed of two cohorts, 
or generations, the young (Y) and the old (0). At any one time individuals 
of different generations are alive and may engage in trading with one another, 
each generation trades with different generations in different periods of their life. 
Individuals work only when young , he/she can transfer consumption 
between 
periods t, and t+1, by saving an amount st, and receiving an interest rate rt+l. 
The economy has a fixed endowment of environmental resources E. The only role 
played by the government is to provide Social Security by a capital reserve system 
in which in period t the government raises dt in contributions from the young, 
and invests the contributions in capital and returns in period t+1, to the old 
generation. The savings of the young in period t and the pension contributions 
collected by the government in period t generate the capital stock that is used 
to produce output in period t+1, in combination with the labor supplied by the 
younger generation during period t+1. 
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1.1. The Decentralized Equilibrium. The economy is composed of indi- 
viduals, government and firms. We assume that the total population of the econ- 
omy Pt, grows at a constant relative rate n and is composed of Lt young workers 
and Rt retired people. Each person born at t lives for two periods and is capable 
of providing one unit of labour in the first period Lt _ (1 + n)Rt. Let the life 
time utility U(t) of a representative individual born at t be dependent upon his 
consumption in both periods, and the value of the environmental variable in the 
second period: 
(1.1) Ut = U[ct, c° 1, ee+l] 
where ct denotes his/her consumption when he/she is young, c° 1 is consump- 
tion when retired , et+l is the value at time t of the environment 
function at time 
t+1. It need to be noted that in this simple model there is no uncertenty, so all 
variables in are known at time t. It is assumed that the life time utility function is 
increasing and quasi concave with respect to all its arguments. 
U'(") > 0, U"(") <o 
1.2. The Environment function. In our model the environment variable, 
broadly interpreted, refers to the standard of living that a country can offer to 
retired people i. e. natural resources. The key idea of the model is that elderly 
people consider this environment variable to be a substitute for consumption over 
the retirement time. The higher the level of this environment variable in a specific 
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country, the smaller is the need for saving when people are young. The environment 
variable enters into the overall utility function (U2). In making a consumption 
decision consumers also consider the value of et+l in the next period i. e. when 
they are old. 
/Rt+i ± Mt+i 
(1.2) et+i =e-wI Rt+ý - 
Pkt 
We assume in (1.6) that the value of the environment, is a function of the envi- 
ronmental endowment (e) i. e. environmental capital stock, minus the sum of the 
congestion coefficient (w) multiplied by the term in brackets adjacent to W that 
represents the value of the congestion in period t+1. The numerator of this ex- 
pression contains the term Rt+1 (retired people) plus or minus Aft+1 which relates 
to migration of retired people in the country. Whilst the denominator contains 
only the variable Rt+l. The idea about the congestion coefficient is that the higher 
the number of retired people resident in one country, the smaller is the value of 
the environment variable for a single retired person (i. e. a congestion effect). We 
can think here of an attractive country with a lot of sun and natural resources and 
perhaps an asthetically pleasing environment. The presence of many residents in 
that country can reduce the value of its natural resources. 
The final expression (, ükt) involves the coefficient ,Q multiplied by the value 
of (kt), which is the ratio of capital to labour. We assume that capital inten- 
sive production produces more pollution that a labour intensive production. The 
more capital intensive production is, the more productive sector in the economy 
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is environmental unfriendly. The pollution produced by highly capital intensive 
production, reduces the value of the environment variable by the coefficient 0. 
Note that the value for a single individual of the environment function at time 
t+1 is a function of the capital at time t. That is because we assume that 
young individuals observe the level of the capital-labour ratio at period t, and 
they ignore the impact of the individuals decision making, upon the overall level 
capital accumulation. Thus for single individuals: 
(1.3) 
dkt+l 
_0 dst 
In doing so a young individual will think that kt+l = kt, and they will evaluate the 
value of et+l as a function of the observed value of the capital kt. 
1.3. The Role of the Government. Without further complications we as- 
sume that the only role played by the government is to provide Social Security by a 
capital reserve system which in period t raises de in contributions from the young, 
invests the contributions as capital, and pays back bt+l to the same generation 
when they are old. 
(1.4) bt+i = (1 + rc+i)da 
The returns to the contributions to public pensions are the same as returns to 
private savings. The role of a Social Security system of this kind can be interpreted 
0 
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as involving compulsory savings imposed by the government on the young i. e. to 
prevent people living miserably in old age because they do not realize when they are 
young the future consequences of their private saving habits. The governments use 
of public pension contributions facilitates capital formation for the next period. We 
assume that the government does not consider the impact upon the environment 
variable given in (1.6) by its saving decision. 
Here we have made an assumption that the government is not interested in 
affecting the environment for the simple reason that the short term advantages 
(e. g profit from car & oil industries, implications for inflation etc. ) outweigh the 
long term disadvantages. 
1.4. The Household Sector. At this stage in order to develop intuition from 
the model, we need to specify a utility function that will allow us to obtain full and 
analytical results. We assume that the typical household has a log-linear utility 
function over consumption level (cr , ct 1) and over the 
level of the environment 
(et+1). 
(1.5) U= ln(4') +a ln[c° 1+ et+i] 
The lifetime allocation problem for the typical household is that of choosing 
ctand ct+1 subject to the lifetime income constraint (1.6) and the value of the 
environmental function (1.6): 
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(1.6) cr = wt - st - bt 
ct 0 1= (st + bt)(1 + rt+i) 
Rc+l ± Mc+l (1.7) ea+i =e- tv - ßkt Rc+l 
where wt is the wage received in period t and rt+l is the interest rate paid on 
private savings (st) and public pension contribution from period t to period t+1. 
Note that having been determined in the period t-1 the value of kt is exogenous 
in the period t. The value of the environment variable et+l depends on the value 
of kt (exogenous within the period t), because as we mentioned before a single 
individual will ignore the impact of individual decision making upon the overall 
level of capital accumulation. By maximizing (1.5) subject to (1.6) and (1.7), we 
have : 
1+ rt+i 
-c1+ 
et+i 
a ci 
Equation (1.8) asserts that the marginal rate of substitution of present con- 
sumption for future consumption, plus the environmental value, must equal the 
interest rates discounted by the time preference parameter a. 
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1.5. The Production Sector. When refering to the production sector, in 
order to develop some intuition we use a specific production function that allows 
us to obtain a full and analytical solution. We consider a competitive economy in 
which firms act competitively and assume log-linear constant returns to technology: 
(1.9) Y= Lta 1n(kt + 1), a>0 
where Y is the level of output in period t, Lt is the labour input ( the number 
of young people in period t. ), kt = Kt/Lt the capital-labour ratio and a is an ex- 
ogenous technology coefficient. We assume that (1.9) is a net production function, 
with depreciation already accounted for. Output per worker yt = Y/Lt, and is 
given by the production function': 
(1.10) yt = aln(kt + 1) 
Firms maximize profits, taking wage rate wt, and the rental rate on capital, 
rt as given. They act competitively, hiring labour from the young cohort, and 
renting capital from the government or the private sector. Hence, the equilibrium 
wage rate and the rate of return on capital, are equal to the respective marginal 
products of labour and capital: 
'Note that for kt > 0, the production function respects the usual concavity assumption: 
f'(kt) = ký+i >0 and fýý(kt) = _( k-+1 
)<0. 
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(1.11) rt = f'(kt) =a kt +1 
wt =f (kt) - ktf'(kt) =a 
[ln(kt 
+ 1) - 
kkt 
+1 
It is helpful to note that y, k, r and w are uniquely and monotonically related 
by the production function (1.9) and the marginal productivity conditions (1.7). 
The market clearing condition will require that total investment be equal to total 
savings including the public pension contribution, so: 
Ke+1-Kc=Lt(se+dt)-Kt 
Where the left-hand side is the net investment and the right-hand side is the net 
savings (saving of the young - dissaving of the old). Eliminating Kt from both sides 
and with Lt+l = (1 +n)Lt we can determine the capital accumulation equation in 
terms of the capital-labour ratio: 
(1.12) ke+l _ 
(st + 
+ ný) 
From (12) we can observe that the capital-labour ratio in period t+1 is de- 
termined by public and private savings in period t. Equation (1.12) represents 
the solution to the model in terms of dynamic behavior of the capital stock kt. 
In the next section we will derive from (1.12) the capital accumulation equation 
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kt+l =f (kt) for a closed economy. The capital accumulation equation is the re- 
lationship between ke+l and kt that describes the path of the capital stock. In 
the second stage we will analyze the effect of the environment variable on capital 
accumulation. Finally in order to discuss a full and analytical solution, we will 
present numerical evaluations of the capital accumulation equation. 
2. Dynamics and Steady State in a closed economy 
We define as a closed economy an economy where there is no trade between the 
rest of the world and that economy. The capital stock is generated internally and 
no capital flows are allowed to enter or exit the economy. Also the labour force is 
generated internally and there is no migration of workers or retired people between 
countries. This will imply Mt =0 all the time so we can simplify (1.7) as: 
(2.1) ee+i =e-w- ß(kt) 
Note that the value of kt is exogenous within the period because it has been 
predetermined by the savings in period t-1. This implies also that the value of 
the enviroment variable et+l is exogenous within the period. 
2.1. Saving decisions. The lifetime allocation problem for the young person 
in a closed economy will be to choose the total amount of saving st, so as to 
maximize the lifetime utility function (1.5) subject to the income constraint (1.10), 
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the government budget constraint (1.4), and the value on the environment given 
by (2.1). The savings as a function of current income is: 
(2.2) st =1 
-f awe (1 + rt )(ý+ca) 
- dý 
1>s;,, 
t > 
0, s; t+l 
5 0(for ejw+ ßkt), si < 0, sdt = -1, sk > 0, sm >0 
Using (2.2) we can easily see that st is increasing with respect to the current 
wage, and with respect to the depletion of the environment given by Ski and W. 
It is also decreasing with respect to the environmental endowment. Note that in 
the case of a fully funded pension system private savings are a perfect substitute 
for the contribution dt. Any increase in social security saving, di, is exactly offset 
by a decrease in private savings in such a way that the total st + dt is constant. 
(2.3) st+dt. 
a 
wt- 
e-w-, Qkt 
1+a (1 + re+l)(1 + a) 
The sum st + dt represents the total savings of the private agents. It is in- 
teresting to note that if the government imposes a public pension contribution 
dt > i+ýwt - (i+rt+l)Q +ý) ' equation 
(2.3) does not hold and st = 02. The economic 
intuition behind this is straightforward: social security contributions provide a 
2That is the unusual case where only government provide public saving. The capital accumu- 
lation equation in this case is simply determinate exogenously by the government. kc+i = 1+ 
44. 
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rate of return equal to the private saving ones; this means that the consumer is, 
therefore, indifferent to who does the saving, they care only about the rate of re- 
turn; any change in the public pension contributions will be fully balanced out by 
an equivalent increase/decrease in private savings. If the government imposes a 
public pension contribution dt above the optimal level defined in (2.3), then agents 
will avoid any kind of private saving. In our analysis we assume that governments 
Okt sets each period dt < ltawt - (l+re+l)( +a . 
This means that social security con- 
tributions do not exceed the amount of savings that the economy would otherwise 
have incurred. We need to point it out that the social security system base on a 
capital reserve does not have any effect on the steady state. 
2.2. Capital accumulation. We assume the supply of capital in period t is 
determined by the sum of total saving decisions of the young, and the government 
in period t-1. We also assume labour is supplied inelastically. The equilibrium 
in the capital/labour markets is obtained when wage and interest rates are such 
that firms use the total amount of capital and labour disposable on the markets. 
The factor market equilibrium is therefore given by equation (1.11). If we combine 
this equilibrium together with the capital accumulation equation (2.2), and the 
optimal saving decision equation of (2.3) we can derive the implicit function of the 
dynamic behavior of capital-labour ratio for a closed economy: 
a (2.4) kt+i = (1-I-a)(1-ýn)a 
[ln(kt+1)- 
k +lJ _e-w- 
ßkt 
t(l+kl)(l+a)(l+n) 
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Equation (2.4) states the relationship between kt+l and kt that defines our curve 
of capital accumulation for the economy. One important property of this function 
depends on the derivative: 
dkt+i 
_I 
(ct j7(1 +_ +ý 
)2 +' Q(1 +k +ý )I 
(2.5) 
dkt (1 + a) (1 + n) (1-F )2 i}1 (e - tv - pký)(k) 
The numerator of equation (2.5) is positive for every kt > 0; it is possible to 
show also that the denominator is positive even when e<=+ ßkt . This means 
that for kt >0 d" >0 so the capital accumulation equation given by (2.4) is dkt 
always increasing. At any point at which the capital accumulation (2.4) crosses 
the 45-degree line at which kt+l = kt there are steady state points. To define the 
nature of the steady state (stable/unstable) we need to evaluate (2.5) at the point 
of steady state; fort dd Ikt+1=kt < 1, we will have a stable steady state solution 
otherwise the steady state will be unstable. 
Since analytical results in terms of stability of the steady state are hard to 
obtain given the complexity of (2.4) and (2.5), the future analysis will be carried 
out using numerical evaluation. 
2.3. A numerical evaluation. Since our model is highly simplified it is not 
our aim to provide precise quantitative estimates; but to derive more realistic 
results from the overlapping generations model, we need to adopt empirically sig- 
nificant parameter estimates for the simulation analysis. 
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2.3.1. The basic case. Using the famous empirical work of Romer, Mankiw and 
Weil (1992) we set the technology coefficient of our production function (10) to 
a= 3503 . We assume a population growth n=0.0254. We also assume the rate 
of intertemporal substitution a=0.95. Setting -e = 0, w=0, ,Q=0 (14) we get: 
a kt (2.6) kt+l = (1 + a)(1 + n, )a 
ln(kt + 1) - kt + 1] 
equation (2.6) represents the dynamic solution for the basic model. In this 
simple case since the environment variable is et+l =0 the environment enters with 
a zero value in the utility function (1.6). The numerical evaluation of (2. G) brings 
us also to a unique equilibrium in steady state with a positive capital stock. This 
solution is represented graphically in figure 1 where the ss represents the 45 degree 
steady state line, The path to the steady state level depends upon the initial level 
of k0. The economy starts out at ka and gradually moves towards the steady state 
capital stock. For example in the case of k0 in figure 1, the per-capita level of 
capital will gradually increase to k', the opposite applies to a starting point like 
kö. 
31n their work Romer, Mankiw and Weil using a sample of 22 OECD over the period 1960-80 
estimated a value of the logoutput per working age income of ln(y) = 7.8. In our model a= 350 
is the value that allows our production function (10) to reach a steady state at the same per 
capita income level. 
4That is the value estimate in terms of Birth rate-Death rate by the Population Reference 
Bureau (http: //www. prb. org) during the last 20 years in the more developed counties. 
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FIGURE 1. Dynamic adjustment for the simplest case 'g = 0, rv = 0, 
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We next want to examine how the level of the steady state changes if we specify 
specific non-zero values for e, and P. 
2.3.2. The environmental endowment Z. In figure 2 we show the indications of 
(2.4) with three positive levels of endowment of the environment e, and keeping 
zu = 0,0 = 0. Note that in this case the value of the environment function (et+l = 
e-tv-ß(kt)) is exogenous in the model and is simply given by et+l = e. In this case 
this numerical solution gives us a unique path for the capital accumulation equation 
(2.4), with two steady states with strictly positive level of capital. The first steady 
state is not stable and is determined by a very small level of capital (k = 0.2)1. 
These different levels are represented by the dotted lines. The continuous line is 
the same one examined in previous section with e=0, w=0,0 = 0. Considering 
4. A MODEL 
'From picture 2 is not possible to see the unstable steady state. 
2. DYNAMICS AND STEADY STATE IN A CLOSED ECONOMY 55 
1200 
1000 
00000000oýýýýa0 
800 
0°00000000000000 
° 
ooo° 00000 
0000000000000öß 
Q 
oo°°00000°p4°oo 
8=1000a 
600 0°°0°°° o0 0000000000000000000000000 
°ö°° °°°°Ö°ÖOo 00 
400 0000°e s 
45 
200 
0 200 400 600 600 1000 1200 
k 
FIGURE 2. Dynamic adjustment for the cases e=0, 'e = 250, e= 
500, e = 1000 
only the stable stady state it is immediately possible to observe that the larger is 
the level of the endowment level of environment taken into account in the saving 
decision, the lower is the level of the Steady State for the economy. The economic 
intuition behind this is that: the environmental resources are a substitute for the 
savings of retired people. The higher is the environmental level, the lower is the 
incentive for each younger generation to save. This obviously is reflected in a lower 
level of capital in Steady State. 
2.3.3. The environment depreciation coefficient P. In figure 3 we repeat the 
same experiment conducted for 9 testing the effect of positive level of 8 on the 
steady state solution. Even in this experiment we find that a positive level of 
0 does not compromise the stability of the capital accumulation equation. We 
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tested three different levels of 0 and we observed that the higher is the level of 
the environmental depreciation coefficient, then the higher is the level of capital in 
steady state6. 
The economic reasoning for this arises because of coordination failure arising 
when the younger generation make their own saving decisions. As we have dis- 
cussed in a previus section, agents evaluate the variable et+l as a function of ke 
because they think that the level of kt+l will not be affected by their own sav- 
ing decision. Also the government with a pension system fully funded and with 
dti < i+«wt - (i+rt+i)( +« is not able to affect the overall saving 
(dt + st). 
If agents evaluate the variable et+l as a function of ki, the value of ei+l is 
exogenous with respect to the period t (et+l = 'e - xa - 8(ke)). We need to 
remember from (1.3) that the value of the capital kt is determined by total savings 
in period t-1. This implies that kt is exogenous with respect to the period t. 
Agents think that they cannot affect the overall level of capital in the next 
period, and consequently the value of the environmental variable (1.7). Therefore 
to compensate for the loss arising from the lower level of the environment variable, 
the typical agents will save more when young. In doing so they will compensate 
for the loss in the environment with more consumption when old. These factors 
will obviously result in a higher level of Steady State capital as shown in figure 3. 
6In this case this numerical solution gives us a unique path for the capital accumulation 
equation with two steady states with strictly positive capital. The first steady state is not stable 
and is determined by a very small level of capital (k=0.1). From picture 3 is not possible to see 
the unstable steady state. 
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3. Some preliminary results 
This chapter has extended the analysis of macroeconomic allocation of resources 
in a dynamic economy introducing an, environmental motive into the utility func- 
tion. We can draw some stylized results from the case observed. 
The introduction of an environmental motive can shift down the capital 
accumulation curve bringing about a lower level of capital stock in Steady State. 
Two countries with access to the same technology and same utility func- 
tions, but with different levels of endowment of environment (e) have two different 
capital accumulation curves, and two different Steady States. 
The fact that individuals discount any impact that they individually can 
have upon capital accumulation can result in a higher level of overall saving. This 
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is in order to compensate for the loss in utility arising from lower environmental 
levels. 
= If we assume that agents are able to predict correctly the level of capital 
in the next period, our findings in term of capital accumulation can be reversed.? 
7If we assume et+l ='e-rý 
(R`+R}ýt+l) 
-ß(kt+l) it is possible to show that for higher levels 
of 3 the capital accumulation curve is shifted down to lower a level of capital stock in Steady 
State. 
CHAPTER 5 
The two country global-equilibrium model 
1. The two economies 
In this Chapter we consider resource allocation in a two-country [Home and 
Foreign (*)] overlapping generations model with free mobility of factors, and free 
migration of labour and retired peoples. 
We assume that these two countries at time t=0 form a Community com- 
prising only of two countries. The community as a whole is characterized in the 
following way: First, we have free trading of goods and services. Second, when inte- 
gration takes place the two economies converge to a fully integrated capital market 
with a unique interest rate rt and unique wage rate wt. Thirdly, householders can 
freely migrate within the community. 
Each country has access to the same production technology given in equation 
(1.9) but may be at a different stage of development. This means that at the time 
of the integration, the countries can have two different levels of capital stock. 
(1.1) ko > kö 
1See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) chapter 3. 
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We also assume that residents of the two countries have identical logarithmic 
preferences given by eq (1.10), and identical population growth rates n= n*. 
Regarding the environment function we assume that the countries have the same 
environment function, but different endownments levels. For this specific case we 
will assume that the foreign country has a higher endownmental. 
(1.2) e*>e zJ*=ztl ß*=, ß 
If there were no integration between the two countries we would have two 
different capital accumulation curves, and also two different levels of capital stock 
in steady state, kSS > ks52. This is shown in Figure 1. 
1.1. The world competitive equilibrium. In this world comprising of two 
countries [Home and Foreign (*)], a competitive equilibrium requires that each 
household resides in one of the two countries, that markets clear, no household can 
make itself better off by selecting a different consumption bundle, or by locating 
in another jurisdiction, and no firms can make higher profits. 
1.1.1: Capital and labour market. With the Home and Foreign markets inte- 
grated by a world capital and labour market, if labour and capital move in opposite 
directions this will equate at time t=0 the interest rate (ri' = ri = rl) and the 
wage (wo' = wo* = wo) in both countries, so that kw ö= ko = kö 
2This is the case discussed in previous chapter where we show that the higher the endowment 
E the lower the Steady State kss" 
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FIGURE 1. Dynamic adjustment for the two counties without integration 
yy Ra_a_a (1.3) r1 = ri = r1 = kow +1 ko +-l ko +1 
(1.40 = wö=wo=a[ln(ko +1)-kw+1] =aýln(k+1)-k*k+l, _ 
00 
= a[ln(ko+1)- 
k0 ] ko+1 
kw o is the unique common capital-labour ratio across the two economies after the 
integration has taken place. This implies identical production technologies, and is 
given by the endowment of the labour force and capital in the two economies: 
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(1.5) kw o =ko=kä=KÖ+K° Lo + Lo 
1.1.2. The environment function. In the context of open economies retired peo- 
ple can migrate across national borders looking for better living conditions. As 
stated in part one refering to the European Union, we assume that governments al- 
low retired people to collect their full pension even if they move abroad. According 
to our model economic integration implies that young agents will also consider the 
possibility of moving abroad for the retirement period. This possibility is implied 
in equation (1.2) when M 76 0. If integration takes place in period 0 and e>ea 
competitive equilibrium requires that in period 1 we observe migration of retired 
people from home to abroad up to the point where: 
(1.6) ei=e1=ei =e-w( 1R1M1 ßkö =e"- za 
Ri 
i+Mil 
, Qkov 
Solving (1.6) with respect to Ml we can calculate the value of the migration 
flow between the two countries: 
e' -eR, R* (1.7) M1=Ri+R1 
Substituting (1.7) in (1.6) we can calculate the value of the global environmental 
function that is given by: 
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(1.8) ei' = e' R, 
Rt 
*+ eRt +tR* - z7 - 
ß(ko ) 
t 
Note that in the new world equilibrium the congestion coefficent = does not 
change. The new world equilibrium is a function of the population size and the 
endownment of the environment of the two economies. At this moment we can 
define the endowment of environment of the world economy such that: 
(1.9) ew =e 
Ri 
RI+Rt ý"eRt 
Rt 
+Rt 
fore >ee >ew >e 
We assume now that at time 0, when economic integration takes place, young 
people will have perfect expectations about future migration of retired people, 
and will make saving decisions considering the new world level of environment 
given in (1.8). At this point it is possible to define the world capital accumulation 
function, that is represented in figure 3. Since e> '61 >e the new accumulation 
function lies between the home and the overseas function. It need to be noted that 
after integration take place, it will occurs every period and this will equalise the 
environmental variable in the two countries all the time. 
1.1.3. The Dynamics of equilibrium and Steady State in the global economy. 
We are now in a position to characterize world equilibrium. In period 0 when 
the integration takes place movement of capital from home to abroad and/or an 
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opposite movement of labour will take place in order to balance the capital-labour 
ratio according to equation (1.8)3, that is represented in Figure 2. The home 
economy will move from point C up to B, and the overseas one will move from 
A to B. Note that the bigger the gap between the two economies in terms of 
the capital-labor ratio, the bigger the jump that the two economies will make in 
period 0 to reach the world capital accumulation curve. After period 0, the two 
economies will move across the common World Capital accumulation curve up to 
the new Steady State kss. 
The world capital accumulation equation will be given by: 
(1.10) 
ku' aa 
fIn 
kw +1- 
kw 
_e 
14+l;; +ex +R - uý - ßkw 
c+i - (1+a)(1+n) L 
(c ) 
ktw+1] 1+ )(l+a)(l+n) 
It is interesting to note that the new equilibrium in terms of the capital-labour 
ratio will be smaller for the home economy and bigger for the foreign one4. Note 
also that the world equilibrium kw does not depend upon the starting points of the 
two economies. We would have the same result even if ko < kö, but it would depend 
upon the endowment of the environment e that affects the saving decisions of the 
agents. The path of the capital-labour ratio is also represented in the time-capital 
axis in figure 3. 
3No assumptions are made to specify how much capital, and how much labour needs to move 
in order to reach the equilibrium. 
4Comparing to the capital-labour ratio before the integration take place. 
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FIGURE 2. Dynamic and Steady State of the world capital-ratio. 
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One criticism that can be made of this kind of solution is that at the time of the 
integration (t = 0) the model implies a big shock in terms of the capital stock for 
the two economies. Many people may think that even with full mobility of capital 
and labour, it is unrealistic in the short run to have that kind of shock. Actually 
the basic idea that we need to keep in mind is that in an overlapping generation 
fashion, each period corresponds to the half life of an individual, so one period in 
our model corresponds to many years in the life of individuals. 
2. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have analyzed the allocation effects of an environmental 
motive in a two country overlapping generation model. Our principal findings 
have been the following: 
6 
kö k0 k0 
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k 
FIGURE 3. Dynamic path of the world capital-ratio. 
1) Using a logarithmic production function and a log linear utility function we 
find a unique stable path for the capital accumulation equation. Given the shape 
of the capital accumulation curve, we also have a unique and stable equilibrium 
for positive levels of the capital-labour ratio in Steady State. 
2) An environmental motive in the saving decision shifts the capital accumula- 
tion curve, and also the steady state capital down. 
3) If young people think that they are no longer able to affect the capital level 
in the next period, they will save more in order to balance with consumption the 
loss in environment when they are old. This will raise the Steady State capital 
level. If the young are conscious of the effect of their own saving decisions on 
capital, then the previous result can be reversed. 
0t 
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4) In a two-country integrated model different endowments of environmental 
resources will activate flows of migration between the two countries such that the 
value of the environment function is the same in both countries. This phenomenon 
will also modify the capital accumulation curve (and the Steady State), for both 
countries. 
5) The bigger the difference in terms of the stage of development between 
the two countries that are going to integrate, the higher the shock that economic 
integration will cause to the economies. 
We now want to point out in an informal manner some generalizations as well 
as limitations of our analysis. In the above idealized model, households respond 
quickly to wage differentials and immediately move to the country offering the 
highest salary. A natural objection to this would be that in reality many people 
are immobile, i. e. they will stay at their original location irrespective of wage 
differentials. We admit, of course that a Spanish worker is unlikely to move to 
Germany at once if he finds wages to be infinitesimally higher there'. Yet, as 
the 21st century will probably become a "century of migration", we also feel that 
this point should not be pushed too far. For our results to hold qualitatively, 
it suffices if there are always some people who consider moving location due to 
higher wages. It seems to be clear that the development of the Common Market, 
5This is not least because there are transaction costs associated with moving to another 
location. 
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the single currency, and the formation of a political union, will make EC residents 
even more mobile. 
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Part 3 
International Retirement Migration, 
Social Security, Dynamic Aspects a 
Simulation Approach 
CHAPTER 6 
Two-period life cycle model 
1. Introduction 
This part of the thesis examines some effect of International retirement Mi- 
gration and social security on the economy. As its title suggests, this part is 
concerned with dynamic aspects. These include the effects of social security on 
capital formation, economic growth, and intergenerational equity. Dynamic anal- 
ysis has recently gained favor over static analysis in various fields of economics. 
A dynamic perspective is crucial in weighing the short-run benefits of particular 
policies against long run losses and in evaluating the economic efficiency of alter- 
native policies. Dynamic analysis considers both current and future generations 
and permits one to distinguish policies that truly improve economic efficiency from 
those that simply redistribute resources across generations. Studying a dynamic 
general equilibrium model involves a number of issues that are not present in a 
static model. These include aggregation of behavior of overlapping generations, 
and solving for the equilibrium transition path of the economy. The difficulties in 
obtaining qualitative or quantitative analytical results influenced our decision to 
use a computer simulation model to study the dynamics of the models. 
The numerical simulation technique is required because of the complexity of 
the problems studied here. As a consequences, the simulation results are highly 
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intuitive and most easily understood by tracing the effects of policy change through 
the differents parts of the models. 
In this model, one young and one old generation exist at any point in time. We 
assume that neither the population or productivity grows and, for the moment, 
that there is no government. 
Since the old in this life cycle model are assumed to spend their old age re= 
sources (their saving plus income earned on their saving) entirely on their old age 
consumption, there are no bequests, gifts, or other forms of net intergenerational 
transfer to the young. As a consequence, the life time earning of the young corre- 
spond to the labour earnings they receive when young. 
If we adopt the convention that output is produced, income is received, and 
consumption occurs at the end of each period, the tangible wealth of the economy 
at the beginning of any period consists of private asset held by the elderly. Since 
the elderly consume all available resources in their possession at the end of their 
last period of life, the capital stock to the economy in the next period consists of 
savings by the current young that they bring into the next period. 
The supplies of productive factors to the economy thus consist of the labour 
supply of the current young and the old, plus the capital supplied by the elderly. 
These factors are supplied to the production sector of the economy. The output 
of the production sector in turn is paid out to the productive factors as returns to 
capital and labor. 
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Since the production sector is competitive, factors are hired to the point where 
marginal revenue products equal factor payments. For the economy to be in equilib- 
rium, the time path of factor demands must equal the time path of factor supplies. 
2. Modeling the economy 
This model consists of two sectors: a household sector, and a production sec- 
tor. For each sector, there is a system of nonlinear equations relating endogenous 
behaviour variable such as consumption and labour supply to predetermined eco- 
nomic variables and the technological parameters. 
By jointly solving the equations of the sectors, we can obtain a solution for the 
equilibrium of the economy. 
2.1. Household behaviour. At any given time the household sector com- 
prises 2 overlapping generations (Young and Old). In each period one generation 
dies and another take its place. 
Individual tastes are assumed to be identical, with differences in behavior being 
generated entirely by differences in economic opportunities. Since all individuals 
in a group (Young or Old) are assumed to be identical, all differences in economic 
opportunities are cross-group differences. The assumption that a single member 
is representative of each generation, makes it possible to describe the aggregate 
behaviour of members of each generation by the behaviour of a single member. 
The model does not include population growth. 
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Households in the model make lifetime decisions about consumption and 
leisure on the basis of the life cycle model of behaviour, leaving no bequests and 
receiving no inheritances. 
2.1.1. Preferences. Each household is assumed to have preferences that can be 
represented by a utility function with current and future values of consumption and 
leisure as arguments. Leisure is measured as a fraction of the maximum amount 
of time an individual could work in a given year, taking values between zero and 
one. 
We restrict preferences by requiring the utility function to be time-separable 
and with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. 
Time separability means that lifetime utility can be expressed as a function of 
the individual function of leisure and consumption in each period: 
(2.1) U(c, l) = U[u(cy, ly), u(co, lo)] 
where c, l are consumption and leisure for the period. It also assumed here that 
the function u(. ) does not vary over time, so that ut(") = u("). The nested CES 
takes the form: 
(2.2) ut = 
Lctl_°}) 
+ alts-p16 
16 
while the life time function is written as: 
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2 
(2.3) U=11 E(1 + 5)(1_t) 
`1-) 
1- ý7 t=i 
or in our specific case (Young and Old): 
11 
/ýr(1-P) 
(1-1) 7 
liý. + aLy + 1+6 
(2.4) U=1 1-7 
where p, a, , y, and 6 are taste parameters that permit a wide range of individual 
behaviour to be represented by this general specification of preferences. Each 
parameter is associated with a different aspect of individual tastes. 
Elasticity of substitution (p). The parameter p determine how responsive 
is the labour supply to consumption. The elasticity of substitution between ct, 
and lt in expression (2.2) is constant and and equal to p. 
Leisure preference parameter (a). The term a represents the intensity of 
household preferences for leisure relative to consumption. The greater is a, the less 
labour will be supplied in order to obtain consumption goods, since the individual 
will prefer a greater amount of leisure instead. If a=0 household would choose 
not to have leisure and the result will be a fixed labor supply assumption. 
Pure rate of time preference (S). In expression (2.3) and (2.4) 6 is a 
discount rate, often referred as the "pure" rate of time preference. It indicates the 
degree to which the household would prefer leisure and consumption earlier rather 
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than later. The larger is 6 the more lifetime resources will be spent early and the 
less will be saved. 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (y). It represents the intertempo- 
ral elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in different periods. 
The size of 7 governs the responsiveness of households to the incentive to save. 
Time separability means that individual decisions at any time depend only on 
the future; past level of consumption and leisure will not affect future decisions. 
The values used for the different parameters of household utility function will 
be discussed later. 
2.1.2. The household budget constraint. At each period, the household decides 
how much to work and how much to consume. Because the household has a life time 
horizon, it makes its current choice as part of a life time plan for consumption and 
leisure, deciding on the path for labor and consumption over time that maximizes 
its utility function (2.4) subject to the lifetime budget constaint that leaves no 
debts. 
The household chooses only its current level of consumption and leisure in each 
year, along with its planned consumption and leisure in future years. Given that 
households are assumed to have perfect foresight, however, each year's current de- 
cision will be consistent with previously made plans. Therefore we can consider 
the entire path of consumption and leisure as having resulted from a single opti- 
mization decision at the date of the household's birth, when it has no previously 
accumulated assets. 
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In the absence of social security, the household budget constraint depends only 
on current and future values of interest rates and wage rates. In this case: 
2t 
(2.5) E 11 [1 + r, ]-'[wtet(1 - lt) - ct] =0 
t=i 8=2 
or in our specific case of young and old: 
(2.6) [WyEY(1-Ly)-Cy]+ 
[1+Ro] 
[WoEo(1-Lo)-Co) =0 
where Ry and Ro are the interest rate when young (Y) and old (0), Wy and Wo 
are the wage rate. Ey and Eo is an adjustment factor to allow for the fact that 
the young household may earn more or less per unit of work because of difference 
in skill in different ages. The value E can been seen as the human capital profile 
reflecting the change in earning capacity over time. 
In addition to this overall budget constraint, it is reasonable to impose the 
requirement that labor supply can never be negative; that is : 
(2.7) lt <1 for all t 
(2.8) Ly <1 
(2.9) Lo C1 
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In case Lo = 1, the household has decided not to provide any units of work 
and has completely "retired". Considering that young households do not hold any 
kind of assets we must exclude the possibility that Ly = 11. 
2.1.3. Choice of consumption and leisure. Let us consider first how households 
behave in their consumption and labour supply decision in the absence of govern- 
ment policy. 
Maximization of the utility function (2.4), subject to the budget constraint (2.6) 
and retirement constraint (2.9) yields first-order conditions for consumption and 
leisure in each period that must be satisfied by the optimum values of consumption 
and leisure2: 
-1) 
1(- P-i 7) _1 (2.10) 
(CY(I-1) 
°+aLy °J C2. ° = iý 
L(i_pý 
( 
P-1 
CO_1 
(2.11) 
1+S 
[(1 
+ 7o)] 
'This will lead us to a solution where Ly =1 and Cy = O. We exclude the possibility that 
young might borrow. 
'We use the Lagrange multiplier method where: 
1 c(1 
ö)+o 
t(1-ö) ti (C( -ö)+cL(1--i) ocP 
I+ 
7 
+A [ [i- 
] 
[WyEy(1- Ly) - Cy] + 
[TTRV 1] [1+Ro] [WoEo(1- Lo) - Co]] + v(1- Lo) 
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C(2.12) CYl ') + aLy 
°) 
(- 
P-1 y) 
aLYP = -X 
[-WyEy] 
/ (1-1) (1-i) -WoEo (2.13) (Co P+ aLo °) aLo° _ -a 
1(1 
+ Ro), 
+' 
using (2.13): µ= "(1+R )(1+R°) we can arrange (2.13) as: 
1 (2.14) 
ýCöl 
°ý + aL0 
Pý 
I -1 ry aLo° _ +A 
[(1 
+ no)] 
[WOEO + µ1 
The term A is the shadow price of life time budget constraint and represents 
the utility value of an additional unit of income in present value. 
The term µ differs from zero if the individual chooses to fully retire in the 
second period. 
The combination of conditions (2.10) and (2.12) yields an expression relating 
consumption and leisure for the young generation: 
/ 
(2.15) Ly 
WyEy 
=I«) 
-P) 
Cy 
while the combination of (2.11) and (2.14) yields an expression relating con- 
sumption and leisure for old generation: 
(2.16) Lo = 
(WoEo l i) 
a 
Co 
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It is evident how the terms p and a influence the labour-leisure trade off. Keep- 
ing a constant a percentage change in with respect to a percentage change in 
effective price of leisure equals p; parameter p determines how responsive individual 
labour supply to the wage rate. An increase in a increase the ratio C 
Substitution of (2.15) into (2.10) and (2.11) takes us to an equation expressing 
the evolution of consumption over time for the household: 
R= 1 
(2.17) Cy= 
(I+ Ro ý' [1 + aP(WYEY)(1-P)] 1-P Co 1+6 
) 
[[1+aP(voEo+'P]J ) i=v 
The interpretation of (2.17) is determined by the wage in both periods. 
In a simple model with fixed labor supply (a = 0) the wages will not have any 
effect on the consumption path. In this case from (2.17) consumption will grow 
over time if the interest rate exceeds the pure rate of time preference ö. 
The transition equation for leisure follows from (2.16) and (2.17): 
P-ly 
(2.18) Ly =1+ 
Ro -7 [1 + aP(WYEr)(1-P)] 
P 
WyEy p 
Lo 
(WWoEo+µ) ( 
1+b) l+ap WE+ (1-a) I-P 
from which it can be shown that leisure grows more slowly than wages grow. 
It is important to remember that equations (2.17) and (2.18) determine the 
shape of the consumption and leisure path, but their absolute levels cannot be 
determined 
To attempt such solution, in this type of model, we would apply (2.17) to 
obtain an expressions of Cy and Co and (2.15) to obtain an expression of Cy and 
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Ly. Combining these expression with the budget constraint (2.6) we can obtain an 
equation in Cy in terms of a fixed parameter. However, when retirement is present, 
there are other endogenous variables in this expression such as the multiplier p, 
therefore we cannot have a closed form solution for Cy. 
2.2. Production Sector. We assume a single production sector that is as- 
sumed to behave competitively, using capital and labor subject to a constant re- 
turns to scale production function. Capital is assumed to be homogeneous and 
non-depreciating, while labor differs only in its efficiency. We assume that all 
forms of labor are perfect substitutes, but individuals in different periods of their 
life supply different amounts of some standard measure of labor input per unit of 
leisure. This amount is the term E discussed in the budget constraint section. 
We assume a simple Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(2.19) Y= AKALl-' 
Where Y, Kt, Lt are output capital and labor at time t, A is a scaling parameter 
and e is a parameter measuring the intensity of use of capital in production. 
In the simulations we are going to present in the next sections, we are going to 
assume A to be constant over time, in doing so we will rule out the possibility of 
technological change. 
2.2.1. Wages and demand for labor. We assume that firms can adjust the 
amount of labor employed costlessy and they act competitively. This leads us 
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to the standard result that, in equilibrium, the wage WW must be equal to the 
marginal product of labor. 
(2.20) Wt = (1- e)AKt Lt 
hence (2.20) expressed the wage as a function of the capital stock and labor. 
2.2.2. Interest rate. We apply the same logic to determinete the interest rate. 
(2.21) Rt = eAKt-'Lt-' 
Equation (2.20) and (2.21) give the wage rate and interest rate as a function 
of the stocks of capital and labor. 
2.3. Government behaviour. The government in this model runs an "un- 
funded" social security system. Let B stand for the social security benefit paid to 
a member of the generation t-1. 
The life time budget constraint for individuals can be written as 
(2.22) [WYEY(1-Lv)-B-Cv]+ 
[1+Ro] 
[1VoEo(1-Lo)-Co+B]=0 
2.4. Equilibrium under perfect foresight. A general equilibrium solution 
is one in which the behaviour of each sector of the economy is consistent with 
the prices that are established in markets. The behaviour of households, firms, 
and the government must be consistent not only with current prices, but also 
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with future ones. Household labor supply and consumption must be optimal, 
given the entire future path of interest rates, wage rates, and tax rates. Firm 
investment decisions must adequately reflect the future behavior of interest rates 
and the stock market. Given the behavior of each sector, markets for labor and 
capital must clear. Because of the assumption of perfect foresight the behavior 
of the economy today depends on conditions in the future. One cannot compute 
a "separate" equilibrium for a given year without a complete characterization of 
future economic developments. Hence, the solution method must treat the present 
and future together. The exact methodology used is the subject of the next section. 
2.4.1. Capital and Labor level. Supply of capital in period t is determined by 
the sum of total saving decisions of the young in period t-1. So in our case: 
(2.23) Kt+1=WyEy(1-Ly)-By-Cy 
Labour is supplied by young and old people according to their productivity E 
(2.24) Nt=Ey(1-Ly)+Eo(1-Lo) 
3. Simulation 
The general equilibrium economic model described above forms the basis for the 
simulation results presented in this part. In this section we are going to examine 
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the choice of parameter values and the method of solving for the quantities that 
characterize the perfect foresight equilibrium. 
3.1. Method. The calculation of the equilibrium path of the economy, given 
a particular parameterizations, typically proceeds in three stages: 
1. Long-run steady state of the economy before any change applies. 
2. Solving for the long-run steady state to which the economy eventually con- 
verges after the change takes place. 
3. Solving for the transition path that the economy takes between these two 
steady states. The transition begins when information about the change 
becomes available. 
Households and firms have perfect foresight in both old and new regimes, but do 
not anticipate the change. The policy change may take the form of an immediate 
change and/or a time dependent change of some variables. 
The iteration techniques used in each of the three stages of the solution are very 
similar although the actual procedure is more complicated when one is solving for 
the transition path, because economic variables are changing over time. 
3.1.1. The initial and final steady state. The solution for the equilibrium of 
the economy in the initial and final steady state is computed solving a difficult 
system of nonlinear equations based on the behavior of households and firms. The 
solution is obtained using an iterative technique often referred in the literature as 
the Gauss-Seidel method'. 
3The software Matlab 7.0 is used in order to compute the simulation. 
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The Gauss-Seidel method is a technique for solving the equations of a system 
one at a time in sequence, and uses previously computed results as soon as they 
are available. 
The algorithm starts with guesses of a subset of the endogenous variables and 
initially treats these variables as exogenous in some of the equations of the system 
in which they appear. This simplification makes the resulting system easier to solve 
for the endogenous variables, including the variables for which guesses were made. 
When the solution for these "guessed" variables equals the guesses themselves, a 
true solution to the full system has been found. Otherwise, the "solution" is not 
consistent with the values of the guessed endogenous variables, and new guesses are 
tried, typically a combination of the two sets of values from the previous iteration. 
A schematic representation of the algorithm is given in figure 1. 
We begin with guesses ex - ante about the aggregate capital stock, K, total 
labor supply, N, the shadow wages µ, and the steady state SS. We thus have: 
(3.1) (K°, N°, µ°, SS°) 
We use (2.21) and (2.24) to calculate the wage and interest rates consistent 
with the factor guessed in (3.1). Then we combine with the guessed shadow wage, 
and social security. This allows us to solve for optimal household behavior using 
(2.17), (2.15), and the budget constraint(2.6). The individual labor supply decisions 
that result tell us whether our shadow price p guesses were accurate or not. Once 
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K, N, t, SS 
Inftial guesses 
1WR 
4 
New gu CL 
From Production Function 
From household behaviour 
Aggregation 
K*, N*, I1*a SS* 
> Solution 
FIGURE 1. Solution by guessing and iteration 
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we have a vector of possible value of consumption, leisure and shadow price, we 
aggregate them using (2.23) and (2.24) we obtain a vector of aggregate ex - post 
, say: 
(3.2) (K`, N*, µ`, SS*) 
if (K, N, y, SS) 34 (K*, N*,, u*, SS*) we start the algorithm again using a new vec- 
tor combination of the two sets of values. If (K°, NO, µ°, SS°) = (K*, N*, µ*, SS*)4 
we consider the solution consistent with the value guesses ex - ante. Typically, 
20-30 iterations are required to achieve convergence to a solution for the initial 
steady state. 
When a change in the model occurs we solve the new steady state without 
knowledge of the precise transition path. 
3.1.2. The transition path. The approach used to solve for the economy's equi- 
librium transition path is similar to that used to calculate the initial and final 
steady states. There are several complications, however. First, because the econ- 
omy undergoes a transition in which conditions change over time, it is necessary 
to solve explicitly for behaviour in each year. Moreover, because households and 
firms are assumed to take into account future prices in determining their behavior, 
it is necessary to solve simultaneously for equilibrium in all transition years. This 
is done in the following way. The simulation model provides the economy with 
4We consider: (K°, NO, µ°, SS°) = (K', N', µ', SS') when the difference of each term is 
smaller than 1%. 
92 6. TWO-PERIOD LIFE CYCLE MODEL 
20 periods to reach a new steady state. After 20 periods the model constrains all 
prices, and shadow wages to be constant to the value of the final steady state. The 
choice of 20 periods is arbitrary, but is intended to provide enough time so that 
the economy will settle down by itself well before it is "forced" to in period 20. 
3.2. Parameters of the model. To solve the model, we must choose val- 
ues for the preference parameters, S, a, p and ry, the production elasticity, e, the 
production scaling constant, A, and the human capital vector, E. Some of these 
parameters have been precisely estimated in several empirical studies. In this sec- 
tion we will try to summarize the relevant literature. Unless otherwise stated we 
are going to use these parameter value. 
3.2.1. Household preferences. 
1.: (y) intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Weber (1970) estimated y 
to lie between 0.13 and 0.41, but in a later study (Weber, 1975) found a 
higher range, between 0.56 and 0.75. Several studies have derived their 
estimates from models of optimal household portfolio behavior under un- 
certainty. Grossman and Shiller (1981) found ry to range from 0.07 to 0.35, 
Mankiw (1981,1985) recorded values of 0.25 and 0.37, respectively, Summers 
(1982) reports about 0.33, and Hall (1981) found values generally below 0.1. 
In the light of this evidence, we choose a value of y=0.2 for our baseline 
simulations. 
2.: (p) consumption and leisure elasticity of substitution. Ghez and Becker 
(1975) found an aggregate value of p=0.8. 
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3.: (5) pure rate of time preference. There is not much evidence of the appro- 
priate value of 5. We choose a value of 0.015 according to Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff, (1983). 
4.: (a) leisure preference parameter. Auerbach, and Kotlikoff, (1983) choose 
a value a=1.5 which results in realistic levels of labor supply5. 
3.2.2. Production parameter. 
1.: (e)Capital intensity. In our Cobb-Douglas production function we set c_ 
0.25. 
2.: (A)Production function constant: This parameter depends on the units 
chosen for output. Thus, we are free to choose A. It is convenient to choose 
a value that leads to a wage rate in steady state equal to 1. In our base model 
this requires a value of A=2.4753, which has been used throughout°. 
4. Simulation results, a change in earning capacity 
4.1. The initial steady state. Table 1 presents the simulated initial steady 
state values of the base case economy. In the base case we assume that there is 
no difference in earning capacity between young and old so Ey = Eo = 1. Then 
the base case wage is 1, reflecting our choice of the coefficient kin the production 
function in (2.19). Return to capital is 3,61% per cent. The economy's interes rate 
5In their 55 period simulation model a value of a =1.5 lead prime age workers to a 40% 
labour vs 60% leisure. In an enviroment of 5,000 hours per year this is the equivalent of 2000 
hours at year or 40 hours a week. 
6This is the case also where Ey = 1, and Ep = 1. 
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Capital stock 0.0593 Income 0.9392 
Labor supply 0.7037 Capital-Output ratio 6,31% 
Wage 1 Interest rate 3,95% 
Consumption Young 0.3949 Labor supply Young 45.38% 
Consumption Old 0.5423 Labor supply Old 24.99% 
Private consumption 0.9372 Social security rate 0% 
TABLE 1. The base case steady state, Ey = Eo =1 
function in (2.19). Return to capital is 3,61% per cent. The economy's interes rate 
is 3,95%. Partial retirement occurs in the life cycle. Labor supply is 45.38% (out 
of a time endowment of 1) for young people and it falls to 24,99% for old people. 
4.2. A structural change in earning capacity. Table 2 displays the large 
impact of a change in youngs earning capacity (Ey = 3) can have on labour supply 
for old people. This can be justified from the fact that full retirement occurs in 
the second period if there is this jump in earning capacity. One other interesting 
result can be observed in Figure 2. Here we plot the labor supply for old people 
as a function of the earning capacity of the young generation in steady state. 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity of these results to alternative choices 
of parameter values is examined in Table 3 and Table 4. They presents the level of 
the capital stock, labor supply, wage rate, interest rate, consumption and leisure 
choices for a range of parameters values. As Table 3 indicates, the size of the 
steady state stock of capital is quite sensitive to the choice of certain preference 
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Capital stock 0.5147 Income 2.5104 
Labor supply 1.2715 Capital-Output ratio 20.5% 
Wage 1.4808 Interest rate 1.22% 
Consumption Young 1.3734 Labor supply Young 42.38% 
Consumption Old 1.1299 Labor supply Old 0% 
Private consumption 2.5034 Social security rate 0% 
TABLE 2. The steady state, EY = 3, E0 =1 
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FIGURE 2. Labor Supply old generation (1 - Lo) as a function of 
earning capacity (Ey) of young generation in steady state. 
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parameters. For example, raising y from 0.10 to 0.50 generates more than a ten 
times increase in the stock of capital. 
Variations in the time preference rate, 5, do not significantly affect the stock of 
savings: lowering the time-preference rate from 0.03 to -0.015 implies a very small 
reduction in capital steady state. In contrast to the supply of capital, the steady 
state aggregate labor supply is relatively unresponsive to these changes in y. It 
is, however, quite sensitive to the choice of p, the static elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure, and the choice of the term a, the leisure utility 
share. Reducing p from 0.8 to 0.3 implies, an increase in aggregate labor supply 
of 15%, while raising a from 0.5 to 4 reduces aggregate labor supply by more than 
66%. 
From Table 4 and Figure 2 we need to point out that labor supply of the 
old generation very sensitive to the difference in earning capacity between young 
and old. In most of the cases we have analyzed the old generation opt for full 
retirement. 
4.4. Transition path. In this section we are going to focus on the transition 
path that occurs after a change in the earning capacity for young people. In Figure 
3 we show the capital path if the change in earning capacity for young people occurs 
in one period. It is interesting to note how it takes 10 periods to-reach 90% level 
of the new steady state. 
In Figure 4 we can see the path for labor supply for old people. It is interesting 
to note how fast is the impact in retirement incentive after an instantaneous change 
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Parameters 
7p5a Cy Ly Co Lo KNYWR 
0.2 0.8 0.015 1.5 0.394 0.546 0.542 0.750 0.0593 0.704 0.939 1 3.95 
0.1 0.8 0.015 1.5 0.295 0.550 0.382 0.711 0.014 0.738 0.679 0.69 12.0 
0.5 0.8 0.015 1.5 0.471 0.510 0.751 0.813 0.194 0.676 1.22 1.35 1.57 
0.2 0.3 0.015 1.5 0.427 0.490 0.602 0.691 0.0552 0.817 1.031 0.94 4.66 
0.2 0.8 0.03 1.5 0.367 0.588 0.494 0.791 0.0623 0.620 0.865 1.04 3.46 
0.2 0.8 -0.015 1.5 0.394 0.546 0.542 0.750 0.0593 0.704 0.939 1 3.95 
0.2 0.8 0.015 0.5 0.501 0.336 0.759 0.510 0.0443 1.153 1.263 0.821 7.13 
0.2 0.8 0.015 4 0.275 0.715 0.347 0.899 0.0710 0.385 0.625 1.21 2.19 
TABLE 3. Steady state sensitivity analysis, Ey = 1, Eo =1 
in earning capacity for young people. It takes only 2 periods to move from a partial 
retirement (Labor supply of old people 25%) to a full retirement. '. 
In Figure 5 and 6 we have reproduced the experiment, assuming the change 
in earning capacity for young people takes 5,10 and 20 periods to move from the 
initial value of Ey =1 to Ey = 3. We assume that Ey grows at the rate of 24%, 
11.6% and 5.6% every period up to the value of Ey=38. 
. The paths for capital and leisure for old people change considerably. 
7See table 1 
8Note these growth rate will allow us to reach the new steady state value in 5,10 and 20 
years. 
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Parameters 
It p 5 a CY LY Co Lo K N Y W R 
0.2 0.8 0.015 1.5 1.373 0.576 1.130 1.000 0.515 1.272 2.510 1.481 1.220 
0.1 0.8 0.015 1.5 1.295 0.594 0.887 0.979 0.321 1.239 2.188 1.324 1.704 
0.5 0.8 0.015 1.5 1.412 0.535 1.714 1.000 0.941 1.395 3.129 1.682 0.832 
0.2 0.3 0.015 1.5 0.978 0.688 1.034 1.000 0.536 0.935 2.014 1.615 0.940 
0.2 0.8 0.03 1.5 1.373 0.576 1.130 1.000 0.515 1.272 2.510 1.481 1.220 
0.2 0.8 -0.015 1.5 1.373 0.576 1.130 1.000 0.515 1.272 2.510 1.481 1.220 
0.2 0.8 0.015 0.5 1.985 0.368 1.824 0.813 0.623 2.085 3.816 1.373 1.532 
0.2 0.8 0.015 4 0.832 0.741 0.763 1.000 0.369 0.778 1.598 1.541 1.082 
TABLE 4. Steady state sensitivity analysis, Ey = 3, Eo =1 
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4.5. Earning capacity VS Retirement incentive. The main finding of 
this section, based on the evidence of the simulation and the sensitivity analysis 
are: 
1. Without any kind of social security only a big difference in earning capacity 
(young vs old) is able to justify a full retirement for the old generation. This 
is evident in our basic model (Table 1) and from the sensitivity analysis of 
the basic model (Table 3). With a high leisure preference parameter (a = 4) 
the old generation will opt-out for full retirement. The retirement decision 
seems to be also affected by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (p) 
2. On the other end it is quite interesting to note that only a high difference 
in earning capacity (Ey » Eo) between young and old is able to justify a 
full retirement for the older generation. In our simulation results (Figure 2 
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and Table 2) only if earning capacity for young people is three times bigger 
than old one we can have a full retirement. As we have seen in Table 4 this 
result is not affected so much by changing the parameters of the model. 
3. Transition paths are relatively fast. It takes only six generations to reach a 
close (90%) value to the new steady state, (Figure 3 and 4). If the change 
in productivity does not occur in one period then the transiction path will 
change and the new steady state will be reached in a longer period (Figure 
5 and 4). 
In the next section we will focus our attention on a social security pension 
system and how this affects results of our model. 
5. Social Security 
This section considers the impact of social security on savings and its potential 
distortionary impact on labor supply. The impact of social security on retirement 
is considered using simulation techniques here due to the difficulty of including 
nonlinear budget constraints in what is already a fairly complex model. We focus 
on the unfunded, "pay-as-you-go" method of financing social security. This is an 
implicit form of deficit finance that has transfer sums going from current younger 
to current older generation. 
The principal findings of this section are as follows: 
: Unfunded social security can crowd out savings 
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: In bringing labour supply distortion Social Security could substantially swap 
labor supply from old to young. 
5.1. Conceptual issues. The impact of introducing an unfunded social secu- 
rity system in a life cycle model can be easily understood by adding social security 
to the simple two-period model of section 1. Let f3, stand for a fixed social security 
benefit paid to a member of generation old who is old at time t. At time t the 
budget constraint for each elderly individual is: 
(5.1) Co=WoEo(1-Lo)+B+[WyEy(1-Ly)-Cy](1+Ro) 
for young individuals born at the beginning of period t, the lifetime budget 
constraint is: 
(5.2) [WyEy(1-Ly)-B-Cy]+ 
[(1+Ro)] 
[WoEo(1-Lo)+B-Co] =0 
Since the social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, social 
security tax revenues per young worker must equal benefit payments to old worker. 
The economy's capital stock is now: 
(5.3) Kt=WYEy(1-Ly)-B-Cy 
From (5.2) and ignoring for the moment potential general equilibrium effects on 
the values of W and R, one can see that introducing unfunded social security 
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lowers the steady state level of lifetime resources. The consumption of the ini- 
tial elderly generation increases because this generation receives benefits without 
having to pay taxes. Equation (5.1) makes this clear; if, starting at time t, B, 
is raised from zero to a positive value, the consumption of the elderly at time t, 
rises by B since the marginal consumption propensity of the elderly is unity. If we 
ignore for the moment changes through time in benefit levels and factor rewards, 
the young, whose marginal propensity to consume is less than unity, will reduce 
their consumption by a fraction of B. Hence, in the initial period in which so- 
cial security is introduced each elderly individual increases his consumption by B 
while each young person reduces his consumption by a fraction of D. Total private 
consumption in the initial period therefore increases, and saving is crowded out. 
Adding general equilibrium effects to this partial equilibrium story only reinforces 
the intergenerational transfer away from future generations. As the capital stock 
is crowded out, the wage falls and the interest rate rises. Those generations that 
are elderly when interest rates rise benefit from the greater return on their savings, 
while the corresponding young and future generations are worse off because the 
concomitant fall in their wages is more detrimental to their economic welfare than 
the reduced price of old age consumption reflected in the higher interest rate. 
In our case of a two-period model in which the social security tax rate is levied at 
time t and kept constant thereafter, the first generation of young workers benefits 
from the general equilibrium changes in factor returns; since the crowding out 
takes one period to get under way, the interest rate is high when they are old, 
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Capital stock 
Labor supply 
0.29021 Income 1.7676 
0.5261 Life time utility -3,677 
1.522 Wage 1.3751 Interes rate 
Consumption Young 0.9140 Labor supply Young 43.73% 
Consumption Old 0.8500 Labor supply Old 8.88% 
Private consumption 1.7640 Social security B0 
TABLE 5. The base case steady state, 13=0 Ey = 2E0 =1 
but the wage of this first set of young workers receive when young is unaffected 
by the introduction of social security. In contrast, generations born after the first 
generation, while benefiting from higher interest rates, receive lower wages during 
their initial working period. 
5.2. Including social security in the simulation model. In the siniula- 
tion model, social security B are received in a lump sum in the second period. The 
value of B is specified to be a fixed amount. Table 5 presents the simulated initial 
steady state values of the base case economy'. We assume double earning capacity 
between young and old. 
Table 6 display the large impact a change in social security 13 can have on the 
economy. 
Relative to the initial situation introducing a "pay as you go" social security 
system bring full retirement in the life cycle for old people. It is interesting to 
'Base case, Ey =2 Eo =1 
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Capital stock 0.0312 Income 1.0829 
Labor supply 0.5280 Life time utility -0.11346 
Wage 0.7696 Interes rate 8.6855 
Consumption Young 0.4819 Labor supply Young 52.8% 
Consumption Old 0.5987 Labor supply Old 0 
Private consumption 1.0805 Social security I3 0.3 
TABLE 6. Steady state, B=0.3 Ey = 2E0 =1 
note that on the one hand the labor supply for young people increases while the 
labor supply for old generation decreases. The overall labor supply does not reduce 
much. From a welfare point of view the second situation is worse than the first one. 
The effect on capital stock can be observed in figure 7 the higher the value of B 
the lower is the steady state level of capital. It is interesting to note that for value 
B>0.3 the economy collapse on a0 level of capital. Figure 8 plot the leisure for 
old generation as function of social security B. It is quite intuitive to see that 
the higher is the level of B the lower (up to full retirement) is the labor supply 
for old generation. It is also interesting to note that the introduction of social 
security on Pay As You Go scheme increases the interest rate. If we relate this 
result to the attainment of the Golden rule1° (see chapter 3), we get the same result 
as Samuelson (1975), where the introduction of a social security system based on 
a PAYG scheme can bees seen as an attempt to reach the golden rule when the 
101n our case where the growth rate of the population is zero (n = 0). 
106 6. TWO-PERIOD LIFE CYCLE MODEL 
0.35 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
A2 
m 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
00. 
0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.3 
L L, 
Social security B 
FIGURE 7. Crowing out of Capital vs Social Security I3 
interest rate is smaller than the growth rate of the population. Obviously in our 
case where n=0 the introduction of the PAYC social security takes us away from 
optimal level of capital that maximizes the steady state life time utility for each 
generation. 
5.3. Simulating the transition to and from an unfunded social secu- 
rity. In this section we present simulations of three transitions to an unfunded 
social security system. The transaction differs with respect to the timing in which 
the social security is introduced. We assume that a fixed social security B=0.3 is 
introduced in the system 
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1. In the first experiment the transition to an unfunded social security occurs 
in one period. 
2. In the second experiment we assume a smooth transition to B=0.3 taking 
place in 10 periods" 
3. In the third experiment we assume a one period transition to B=0.3 then 
a smooth transaction back to the funded social security taking place in 20 
periods12. 
Figure 9 shows the three paths of the variable P. 
11A B=0.03 is introduced in the first period therefore we assume a constant growth of fl 
at 29.20% for the next 9 periods. 
'2 We assume B decrease at 20% rate during this phase. 
0 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 
Social Security B 
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FIGURE 9. Three transitions to an unfunded social security system. 
5.3.1. One period adjustment. Table 7 presents the simulation results of a tran- 
sition to an unfunded social security system. We assume that in period 1 the 
economy is running in steady state13. In period 2 an unfunded social security is 
introduced where the young generation has to pay aB=0.3 to the old generation. 
Capital stock falls very rapidly to the new steady state value which is 1/10 of 
the initial capital stock. Although the crowding out process is somewhat faster in 
13Where earning capacity are Ey = 2, Eo = 1. 
za6 ti lu 11 14 lb 19 2u 
Periods 
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Capital Stock Labor Supply 
Period of transition K TV Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.29 1.351 43% 8.8% 51.8% 
2 0.13 1.13 47% 1.5% 48.5% 
3 0.088 1.013 49.7% 1% 48.7% 
4 0.067 0.941 50.4% 1% 51.4% 
5 0.055 0.897 51% 1% 52% 
10 0.036 0.830 52.1% 0% 52.1% 
15 0.0316 0.772 52.6% 0% 52.6% 
20 0.0311 0.769 52.8% 0% 52.6% 
TABLE 7. Simulation transition to unfunded social security system 
in one period 
this case, more than half of the reduction in the capital stock occurs within the 
first period of introducing unfunded social security. 
The aggregate supply of labor falls rapidly in the first period. Over time, how- 
ever, as capital is crowded out, income effects appear to outweight substitution 
effects, and the supply of labor begins to increase. In the final steady state aggre- 
gate labor supply ends up somewhat larger than the initial value. The supply of 
labor for young generation seems to increase all the time while the old generation 
are opting for full retirement after five period. 
5.3.2. Impact on welfare. The effects on welfare of introducing unfunded social 
security are presented in Table 8. The initial old generation (the second row in 
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Life Consumption Life Income Life time Utility 
Generation 
1 Steady State 1.76 1.32 0 
2 1.94 1.37 +2.72% 
3 1.44 0.98 -6.11% 
4 1.32 0.93 -17.79% 
5 1.25 0.90 -27.84% 
10 1.12 0.83 -54.72% 
15 1.089 0.81 -57.89% 
20 1.08 0.81 -71.72% 
TABLE 8. Simulation transition to unfunded social security system 
in one period, impact on welfare 
the table) are better off because of the social security, whereas the initial young 
generation (the third row) suffer welfare losses because of the program. 
Although the welfare gains to the initial generation, measured as wealth equiv- 
alents, are small, the welfare losses to generations in the long run under social 
security are substantial. 
5.3.3. Slow adjustment. Table 9 presents simulation results of a transition to 
un unfunded social security system in a slow motion. We assume that in period 1 
the economy is running in steady state". In period 2 an unfunded social security 
14Where earning capacity are Ey = 2, Eo = 1. 
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is introduced where young generation has to pay aB=0.03 to old generation. In 
this case the social security contribution is ten times smaller than the one used 
previously (Table 7). From period 2 we assume a constant growth of B at 29.20% 
for the next 9 periods, after period 10 the social security contribution is kept 
constant at 0.3. 
Capital stock falls, not very fast in the transition period. Although the crowd- 
ing out process is not very fast, in this case, most of the reduction in the capital 
stock occurs after period 10 when the social security contribution B is kept con- 
stant at 0.3 level. 
The aggregate supply of labor increases over the first 3 periods, to falls rapidly 
in the next 7. However, as capital is crowded out, income effect outweight substi- 
tution effects, and the supply of labor begins to increase once the social security 
contribution B is stable at 0.3 level. In the final steady state aggregate labor 
supply ends up somewhat larger than initial value. 
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Capital Stock Social Security Labor Supply 
Period of transition K TV B Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.29 1.351 0 43% 8.8% 51.8% 
2 0.27 1.351 0.03 45.2% 8.8% 51.3% 
3 0.25 1.336 0.038 45.4% 8.8% 51.1%% 
4 0.24 1.322 0.05 45.8% 8% 53.8% 
5 0.23 1.305 0.064 46% 7.5% 53.5% 
10 0.093 1.02 0.3 49.5% 1% 50.5% 
15 0.041 0.83 0.3 52.6% 0% 52.6% 
20 0.0311 0.769 0.3 52.8% 0% 52.6% 
TABLE 9. Simulation transition to an unfunded social security sys- 
tem in slow motion 
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5.3.4. Impact on welfare. The effect on welfare Of introducing unfunded social 
security in a slow motion are presented in Table 10. The initial old generation 
(the second row in the table) is marginally better off because of the social security, 
whereas the initial young generation (the third row) suffer a small welfare losses 
because of the program. 
Although the welfare gains to initial generation, measures as wealth equivalents, 
are very small, the welfare losses to generations in the long run under social security 
are substantial. 
5.3.5. Back to the funded social security. Table 11 presents results of a transi- 
tion from an unfunded social security system to a situation where social security 
is not present (the initial steady state situation). We assume that in period 1 the 
economy in running in steady state. In period 2a huge unfunded social security 
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Life Consumption Social Security Life Income Life time Utility 
Generation B 
1 Steady State 1.76 0 1.32 0 
2 1.78 0.03 1.329 +0.42% 
3 1.73 0.038 1.28 -0.45% 
4 1.71 0.05 1.27 -1.22% 
5 1.69 0.064 1.26 -1.86% 
10 1.46 0.3 1 -9.68% 
15 1.16 0.3 0.85 -50.47% 
20 1.08 0.3 0.769 -71.72% 
TABLE 10. Simulation transition to un unfunded social security sys- 
tem in ten perigds, impact on welfare 
is introduced where young generation has to pay B=0.3 to the old generation. 
From period 3 we assume a constant reduction of the Social Security, contribution 
B at 20% rate. 
5.3.6. Impact on welfare. The effect on welfare of coming back from an un- 
funded social security in a slow motion are presented in Table 12. The initial old 
generation (the second row in the table) is better off because of the social secu- 
rity, whereas the initial young generation (the third row) suffer a big welfare losses 
because of the program and also due to the reduction in capital. 
5. SOCIAL SECURITY 115 
Capital Stock Social Security Labor Supply 
Period of transition K 1V B Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.29 1.351 0 43% 8.8% 51.8% 
2 0.13 1.134 0.3. 48% 1% 49% 
3 0.11 1.076 0.24 48% '4% 52% 
4 0.13 1.088 0.192 47% 6% 53% 
5 0.15 1.128 0.153 47% 8% 54% 
10 0.23 1.299 0.05 45% 9% 54% 
15 0.27 1.35 0.016 44% 8.5% 52.5% 
20 0.29 1.37 0.005 43% 8% 51% 
TABLE 11. Simulation transition back to a funded social security 
system in slow motion 
Although the welfare gains to the first generation, measured as wealth equiv- 
alents, are very small, the welfare losses for the third and forth generations are 
substantial. Only in the long term, when the there is no more social security is 
there no significant loss in welfare. 
5.3.7. Policy Implications. With regards to public policy, Table 12 shows an 
interesting and actual result with respect to the European situation. Since 1990 all 
European countries have been implementing many policies affecting the way social 
security is financed. In particular with respect to the pension systems, many 
European countries are slowly swapping from a PAYG system to a fully funded 
one. On the debate a lot of attention is given to the reason why all European 
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Life Consumption Social Security Life Income Life time Utility 
Generation 
1 Steady State 1.76 0 1.32 0 
2 1.64 0.3 1.37 +2.72% 
3 1.46 0.24 1.06 -17.8% 
4 1.51 0.192 1.09 -34% 
5 1.56 0.153 1.13 -37% 
10 1.72 0.05 1.26 -14% 
15 1.75 0.016 1.27 -1.5% 
20 1.76 0.005 1.31 -1.5% 
TABLE 12. Simulation transition back to a funded social security 
system, impact on welfare 
countries have made this choice, like the low fertility rate and the public finance 
unsustainability of the current systems15. No a lot of attention has been given 
to the loss for the' generations that live during the transition. In other words, as 
stated in the previous paragraph, moving away from a PAYG to a fully funded 
system has a cost for the young generations, who on one hand have to pay the 
PAYG contribution for the current old generation, but on the other hand they will 
have to save for their retirement. The overall result, as stated in Table 12, is that 
15See Kieran Mc Morrow, Werner Roeger (2002) 
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the generations in which changes take place suffer a substantial lost in terms of 
life time consumption and utility. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain and illustrate the dynamic 
impact of alternative social security system. 
The simulation results, although based on a highly simplified economic model, 
suggest that social security can have powerful effects on the economy. Prolonged 
and significant social security are policies that can substantially alter the course 
of saving, investment and factor rewards. Many of these policies are effective 
primarily because they transfer resources across generations. Such changes in 
economic incentives can significantly alter the degree of economic efficiency. 
The simulation conducted in this part suggests that introducing unfunded so- 
cial security can substantially crowd out long run capital formation. The effects 
on welfare of introducing unfunded social security in our model show unique re- 
sults. All initial older generations are better off because of social security, whereas 
all younger generations suffer welfare losses because of the introduction of social 
security. 
CHAPTER 7 
Modeling International Retirement Migration 
This chapter considers the impact of international retirement migration on 
savings and its potential distortionary impact on labour supply for the host country. 
As we have seen in the first part of this thesis, the EU itself is not a welfare 
provider, instead it regulates access to domestic social security systems. In order 
to understand the economic consequences of a migration in retirement, we need to 
specify that in the EU the right to freedom of movement is based on a principle of 
non-discrimination. The impact of international retirement migration is considered 
again using simulation techniques. We focus on two aspects of IRM: 
1. Based on the non-discrimination principle, once in the host country the 
international retirement migrant can access certain parts of social security 
free of charge. (i. e. health care, public servicies). 
2. In order to support their living in the host country international retirement 
migrants will bring with them all or part of their savings. We will refer to 
these savings as foreign savings. These savings, by affecting the overall 
capital stock in the host country, may modify the general equilibrium values 
of wage and interest rate. We also assume that once in the host country the 
retire migration will not work. 
The principal findings of this section are as follows: 
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: Generally International Retirement Migration increases savings of the host 
country. 
: In accessing part of the social security free of charge in the host contry, IRM 
reduces the welfare of the first generation. This welfare loss is compensated 
by the welfare gain of the future generations. 
: IRM could compensate the crowding out of savings due to social security. In 
other words IRM induce a displacement effect of social security. 
1. IRM and Social security 
Keeping in mind the unfunded, "pay-as-you-go" method of financing social 
security discussed in chapter 6, the impact of introducing international retirement 
migration in a life cycle model can be understood by reducing the benefit paid 
to a member of the older generation who is old at time t. Let I3, stand for a 
fixed social security benefit paid from a young generation. The old generation at 
time t will receive only a fraction of B let's say (1 - O)1 due to the presence of 
international retirement migration, where 0 is the fraction of social security that 
the international retirement migrant enjoys due to the non-discrimination principle. 
The parameter B is a function of two elements concerning IRM. It reflects how large 
is the IRM community in the host country. Also it reflects how many services a 
retired migrants can access in the host country'. At time t the budget constraint 
for each elderly individual is: 
'Here we assume a sort of implicit discrimination in accessing social security for foreigner. 
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(1.1) Co=WoEo(1-Lo)+B(1-0)+[WyEy(1-Ly)-Cy-B](1+Ro) 
for young individuals born at the beginning of period t, the lifetime budget 
constraint is: 
(i. 2) 
[WyEy(1-Ly)-B-Cy]+ 1(1 
+Ro)j 
[WoEo(1-Lo)+B(1-0)-Co) =0 
Since the social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, social 
security tax revenues per young worker must equal benefit payments to old workers 
and international retirement migrants . The economy's capital stock is: ' 
(1.3) Kt=WyEy(1-Ly)-f - Cy 
From (1.1) and ignoring for the moment potential general equilibrium effects on 
the values of W and R, one can see that introducing IRM increases the steady 
state level of lifetime resources. The consumption of the initial elderly generation 
will decrease because this generation has to share the social security benefits with 
IRM. Equation (1.1) makes this clear; if, starting at time t, 0, is raised from zero to 
a positive value, the consumption of the elderly at time t, decreases by . 39. If we 
ignore for the moment changes through time in factor rewards, the young, whose 
marginal propensity to consume is less than unity, will reduce their consumption by 
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Capital stock 0.1162 Income 1.4436 
Labor supply 0.998 Capital-Output ratio 8,04% 
Wage 1.08 8, IRM coefficent 0 
Consumption Young 0.70 Labor supply Young 0.52 
Consumption Old 0.73 Labor supply Old 0.94 
Private consumption 1.43 Social Security B 0.2 
TABLE 1. The base case steadystate for International Retirement 
Migration, B=0.2, Ey = 2Eo =1 
a fraction of BB. Hence, in the initial period in which IRM takes place each elderly 
individual reduces their consumption by BB while each young person reduces their 
consumption by a fraction of B(1 - 9). Total private consumption in the initial 
period therefore decreases and savings increase. 
Adding general equilibrium effects, the capital stock due to the high saving will 
increase, the wage will increase and the interest rate will decrease. 
1.1. Simulation results, social security and IRM. 
1.1.1. The base case. Table 1 presents the simulated initial steady state values 
of the base case economy from which we can study the economic effects of IRM. 
In the base case we assume double earning capacity between young and old so 
Ey = 2, Eo = 1. Let B=0.2, stand for a fixed social security benefit paid to a 
member of old generation. 
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1.2. Steady state effects of social security and International Retire- 
ment Migration. Starting from the base case discussed in table 1, table 2 displays 
the impact of various IRM coefficents (0) on capital stock income and aggregate 
labor supply. In our case of a two-phase model in which the IRM is introduced 
at time t and kept constant thereafter, the first generation of old workers will be 
worse off and the first generation of young will save more. In the long run from the 
general equilibrium changes in factor returns; since the increase of saving takes one 
period to get under way, the interest rate is lower when they are old, but the wage 
this first set of young workers receive when young is unaffected by the introduction 
of IRM. In contrast, generations born after the first generation, while benefiting 
from lower interest rates, receive higher wages during their working period. 
1.3. Transition path with social security and International Retire- 
ment Migration. In this section we present simulations of two possible scenario 
of IRM: 
1. In the first experiment we assume a small value of IRM coefficent 0=0.05. 
2. In the second experiment we assume a large value, 0=0.3. 
1.3.1. A low level of IRM (0 = 0.05). Table 3 presents the simulation results 
of a transition from one steady state without IRM to another one with IRM. We 
assume that in period 1 the economy is running in steady state with social security 
B=0.2 and no IRM (0 = 0). In period 2 we introduce IRM with a small value 
of 0=0.05. This is the fraction of social security that the international retirement 
migrant enjoys due to the non-discrimination principle. This means that from 
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" IRM coefficent Capital Stock Income Social Security 
0 K Y B 
0 0.1162 1.4436 0.2 
0.01 0.11628 1.444 0.2 
0.05 0.11984 1.4584 0.2 
0.1 0.1235 1.4733 0.2 
0.15 0.1272 1.488 0.2 
0.2 0.1311 1.503 0.2 
0.3 0.1379 1.532 0.2 
0.5 0.1540 1.589 0.2 
TABLE 2. International Retirement Migration, effect on Steady State 
the second generation, old natives will have to share part of the social security 
entitlement with IRM. It is interesting to note that 0=0.05 increases the capital 
level in steady state by 3.1%. Labour supply changes only slightly. 
1.3.2. Impact on welfare. The effects on welfare of introducing IRM are pre- 
sented in Table 4. The initial old generation (the second row in the table 4) are 
worse off by a very small amount because of the IRM, whereas the initial young 
generation (the third row in table 4) suffers also very small welfare losses because 
of the IRM. 
The welfare lost to the initial generation, measured as wealth equivalents, is 
very small and is compensated by the welfare gain to generations in the long run. 
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Capital Stock Labour Supply 
Period of transition K 9 Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.1162 0 47.21% 5.3% 52.56% 
2 0.117 0.05 47.27% 5.4% 52.67% 
3 0.1183 0.05 47.26% 5.4% 52.66% 
4 0.1194 0.05 47.26% 5.4% 52.66% 
5 0.1195 0.05 47.25% 5.5% 52.75% 
10 0.1197 0.05 47.24% 5.5% 52.74% 
15 0.1198 0.05 47.25% 5.5% 52.75% 
20 0.11984 0.05 47.25% 5.6% 52.85% 
TABLE 3. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, 0=0.05 
1.3.3. A high level of IRM (0 = 0.3). Table 5 presents the simulation results 
of a transition from one steady state without IRM to another one with IRM with 
a high level of 0=0.3 
1.3.4. Impact on welfare. The effects on welfare of introducing IRM are pre- 
sented in Table 6. The initial old generation (the second one in the table) is worse 
off because of the IRM, whereas the initial young generation (the third one) suffers 
welfare losses because of the IRM. 
Although the welfare lost to the initial generation, measured as wealth equiv- 
alents, is small, it is compensated by the welfare gain to generations in the long 
run. 
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Life Consumption Life time Utility 
Generation 
A 
1 Steady State 1.43928 0 
2 1.4375 -0.50% 
3 1.436 -0.32% 
4 1.4355 -0.11% 
5 1.4393 +0.01% 
10 1.444 +0.41% 
15 1.4445 +0.46% 
20 1.44424 +0.47% 
TABLE 4. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, 0=0.05, impact on welfare 
2. Foreign savings and Iß. M 
Let's assume R is a fixed amount of savings brought by the international 
retirement migrants in to the host country. The economy's capital stock will be: 
(2.1) Kt=WyEy(1-Ly)-B- Cy+IC. 
We will express K' as percentage of Kt : 
(2.2) K* = TKo 
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Capital Stock Labor Supply 
Period of transition K0 Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.1162 0 47.21% 5.3% 52.56% 
2 0.12684 0.3 47.57% 7.3% 54.56% 
3 0.1312 0.3 47.46% 7.2% 54.48% 
4 0.13353 0.3 47.44% 7.1% 54,48% 
5 0.13476 0.3 47.30% 7.1% 54.4% 
10 0.13604 0.3 47.3% 7.1% 54.4% 
15 0.13608 0.3 47.3% 7.1% 54.4% 
20 0.1379 0.3 47.33% 7.1% 54.43% 
TABLE 5. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, 0=0.3 
and we assume 1>T>0. Where we call r the IRM savings coefficent. From 
(2.1) it is clear that once IRM takes place the level of capital will increase with 
consequent reduction in R and an increase in IV. The consumption of the initial 
elderly generation will decrease because this generation will receive less interest on 
their savings. In order to discuss the long term effects we will use a simulation 
technique. In our transition path the IRM foreign savings will be kept constant 
over time. 
2.1. Simulation results, foreign savings and IIM. 
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Life Consumption Life time Utility 
Generation 
1 Steady State 1.43928 0 
2 1.42697 -3.675% 
3 1.44444 -0.918% 
4 1.45366 0.487% 
5 1.45847 1.209% 
10 1.46349 1.965% 
15 1.46368 1.979% 
20 1.46369 1.981% 
TABLE 6. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, 0=0.3, impact on welfare 
2.1.1. The base case. Table 7 presents the simulated initial steady state values 
of the base case economy we choose to study the economic effects of foreign saving. 
Also in this situation we assume double earning capacity between young and old 
so Ey = 2, Eo =1 and social security contributions F3 = 0.2. 
2.2. Steady state effects of foreign savings. Starting from the base case 
shown in table 7, table 8 displays the impact of various IRM saving coefficents on 
capital stock interest rates and wages in steady state. For simplicity in our analysis 
we keep 0=0. It is clear that the introduction of foreign savings will increase the 
level of capital in steady state, thereby modifying the levels of interest rates and 
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Capital stock 0.1162 Income 1.4436 
Labor supply 0.998 Capital-Output ratio 8,04% 
Wage 1.08 T, IRM Saving coefficent 0 
Consumption Young 0.70 Labor supply Young 0.52 
Consumption Old 0.73 Labor supply Old 0.94 
Private consumption 1.43 Social Security B 0.2 
TABLE 7. The base case steady state to study International Retire- 
ment Migration and foreign saving, 0=0, B=0.2, Ey = 2, Eo =1 
wages. It is interesting to note how the IRM saving coefficent also increases savings 
in the host country. The economic intuition behind this is that in the presence of 
foreign savings home capital increases and consequently interest rates decrease. In 
the new scenario young people will face lower interests rates and so they will have 
to save more in order to keep the same consumption when old. In this case we find 
the that income effect is bigger than substitution effect. 
2.3. Transition path with foreign savings. We assume that in period 1 
the economy is running in steady state with social security B=0.2 and no foreign 
savings (T = 0). In period 2 we introduce foreign savings and we keep it constant 
in nominal terms for the future. In having foreign savings the old generation in 
period 2 will be worse off because they will receive less interest for their savings. 
In this section we present simulations of the transition of two possible scenarios of 
IRM savings coefficient: 
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IRM saving coefficent Capital Stock Interest Rate Wage 
T K R TV 
0 0.1162 3.1036 1.08 
0.05 0.1272 2.909 1.108 
0.1 0.13795 2.7473 1.129 
0.2 0.1572 2.502 1.165 
0.3 0.1755 2.311 1.196 
0.5 0.2104 2.02 1.249 
0.8 0.2598 1.7414 1.314 
1 0.2931 1.595 1.353 
TABLE 8. International Retiremnt Migration and foreign saving, ef- 
fect on Steady State 
1. In the first experiment we assume a small value of I IM savings coefficient 
T=0.1. 
2. In the second we assume a large value, T=1 
2.3.1. A low level or foreign savings (r = 0.1). Table 9 presents the simulation 
results of a transition from one steady state without foreign savings to another one 
with foreign savings. The immediate effect is a shift of labour supply for old people 
while the supply of labour for young stays constant and in the long term slightly 
reduces. On the capital side foreign savings will make home people save more, in 
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Capital Stock Foreign saving Labour Supply 
Period of transition K IC* Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.1162 0 47.21% 5.3% 52.56% 
2 0.1266 0.0116 47.21% 6.878% 54.08% 
3 0.13101 0.0116 47.09% 6.718% 53.81% 
4 0.13326 0.0116 47.04% 6.637% 53.68% 
5 0.1344 0.0116 47.01% 6.596% 53.61% 
10 0.13553 0.0116 46.98% 6.556% 53.54% 
15 0.13556 0.0116 46.98% 6.554% 53.54% 
20 0.13795 0.0116 46.96% 6.685% 53.64% 
TABLE 9. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, T=0.1 
fact a 10% injection of foreign savings into the economy increase the overall capital 
by 18.7%. 
2.3.2. Impact on welfare. The effects on welfare of IR. M foreign savings are 
presented in table 10 . The initial old generation 
(the second one in the table) are 
slightly worse off by a very small amount because of the IRM. The welfare loss to 
the initial generation, measured as wealth equivalents, is very small and it is more 
than compensated by the substantial welfare gain to the future generations. 
2.3.3. A high level or foreign savings (r = 1). We are assuming now that 
the level of foreign savings is the same amount of the initial capital of the home 
economy. Table 11 presents the simulation results. The effects we have are the 
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Life Consumption Life time Utility 
Generation 
1 Steady State 1.43928 0 
2 1.43817 -0.750% 
3 1.45665 2.065% 
4 1.46605 3.448% 
5 1.4708 4.136% 
10 1.47546 4.799% 
15 1.47561 4.820% 
20 1.4797 4.837% 
TABLE 10. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, 7=0.1, impact on welfare 
same as the ones we find in the previous section (r = 0.1) with higher magnitude. 
We have an immediate shift of labour supply for old people that will smoothly 
reduce in the long term. On the capital side foreign savings will make home people 
save much more. 
2.3.4. Impact on welfare. Welfare effects are presented in table 12 . The initial 
old generation (the second one in the table) is worse off for a small amount because 
of the lost in interest rate they get from lower interest rate. The welfare lost to 
the initial generation, measured as wealth equivalents, is small and it is more than 
compensated by the substiantial welfare gains of the future generations. 
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Capital Stock Foreign saving Labor Supply 
Period of transition K It' Young Old Aggregate 
1 Steady State 0.1162 0 47.21% 5.3% 52.56% 
2 0.22375 0.116 46.98% 16.05% 63.04% 
3 0.2642 0.116 46.26% 13.25% 59.50% 
4 0.28022 0.116 46.02% 12.29% 58.31% 
5 0.28614 0.116 45.94% 11.95% 57.89% 
10 0.28944 0.116 45.90% 11.83% 57.66% 
15 0.28944 0.116 45.90% 11.79% 57.66% 
20 0.29315 0.116 45.89% 11.96% 57.85% 
TABLE 11. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, T=1 
3. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain and illustrate the dynamic 
impact of International Retirement Migration. IRM has a displacement effect on 
social security, in terms of saving, investment and factor rewards. We have focused 
on free riding of IRM in the host country and foreign savings. In both cases IRM 
increases the savings of the host country. In contrast to social security, all initial 
old generations are worse off because of IIM, whereas all young generations have 
a welfare gain. The simulation methodology has proved useful not only for tracing 
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Life Consumption Life time Utility 
Generation 
1 Steady State 1.43928 0 
2 1.43883 -4.829% 
3 1.58954 15.760% 
4 1.64537 21.768% 
5 1.66555 23.768% 
10 1.6767 24.839% 
15 1.67674 24.844% 
20 1.67675 24.777% 
TABLE 12. Simulation transition with International Retirement Mi- 
gration, T=1, impact on welfare 
the channels through which IRM operates, but also for obtaining a quantitative 
sense of the relative impacts of alternative actions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
General conclusions and suggestions for further studies 
1. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explain and illustrate the static and 
dynamic economic impact of international retirement migration. Divided into three 
parts, the thesis considers different aspects of international retirement migration. 
The first part introduced the problem and examined the legal framework in 
which it exists. Based on the principle of non-discrimination, the access to the 
welfare system is contradicted by various European Directives which regulate the 
possibility of free riding through the resource requirement. This represents a debat- 
able issue for international retirement migration. Another obstacle to examining 
the issue of IRM has been the lack of reliable statistics. Although figures are 
unknown, we can conclude that the IRM is not a homogeneous group and it can 
be divided into three different subgroups. From a legal perspective, these groups 
have different rights with respect to the access to the social security system. The 
most obvious economic implication of IRM within the European Union is twofold. 
Migrants can access part or all of social security services in the host country. Also, 
they are required to bring into the host country some source of income in order to 
sustain themselves. 
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The second part of the thesis examines the reasons for IRM from one country to 
another. Using a quantitative model, we have identified an environmental variable 
which can explain one reason why IRM may take place. Different endowments of 
environmental resources may activate flows of migration between two countries. We 
have assumed that people in their younger years live in countries with a high capital 
per capita and on retirement move to a country where this rate is lower but the 
environmental variable is high in order to enjoy quality of life. This phenomenon 
may result in a modified capital accumulation for both countries. 
In the third and the most important part of the thesis, we analyze the economic 
effect of social security and IRM through simulation techniques. The simulation 
results, although based on a highly simplified economic model, suggest that IRM 
can have powerful effects on the economy. Prolonged and significant presence of 
IRM can substantially alter the course of savings, investment and factor rewards. 
Many of these outcomes are effective primarily because they transfer resources 
across generations. Others are effective because they change economic incentives. 
Such changes can significantly alter the degree of economic efficiency, in a direc- 
tion which may not necessarily correspond to the direction of change in long-run 
welfare. The simulation methodology has proved useful not only for tracing the 
channels through which IRM and social security operate and interact, but also for 
obtaining a quantitative sense of the relative impacts. The simulations suggest that 
introducing unfunded social security can substantially. crowd out long-run capital 
formation. Furthermore, IRM may have a displacement effect on social security. It 
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can be seen as a mechanism for disguising a shift to a non funded social security 
system. In some countries however IRM and unfunded social security interplay 
together diminishing the negative effects of unfunded social security. 
2. Suggestions for further studies 
There are many points to be considered for future studies. Hero we want to 
summarise some: 
" In chapter 7 while we were analysing foreign savings and IRM we have as- 
sumed that there are no capital flows without flows of people. In other 
words, we assume that capital moves only with IRM. This is a strong limi- 
tation from a globalisation perspective. 
" From a public point of view if K also includes public infrastructures, then 
K*(foreign saving brought by IRM) could be viewed as an alternative tax 
revenue turned into capital. 
" If public policy can affect the level of 0 (the fraction of social security that 
the international retirement migrants enjoys) for example in making benefits 
more available for migrants, this would be a way to attract foreign capital 
from abroad. 
" An unsolved issue of this thesis is the way to compensate the initial old 
generation which is worse off from IR M. 
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Some of the suggestions do not require extensive modeling but different in- 
terpretation of the models. For instance tax on foreign saving can be a way to 
compensate the initial old generation that is worse off from IRM. 
2.1. Limitations of the models. The present models are just a stereotype 
and differ from the economic reality in a number of obvious ways. There is no 
involuntary unemployment, only a single asset, only a single homogeneous labor 
input, no international trade, no uncertainty, no differences across individuals in 
tastes, no market imperfections, no disequilibrium, and no money. For these rea- 
sons and many others, this model cannot be used for economic predictions or for 
providing explicit policy recommendations. However, the model can greatly ex- 
pand one's intuition about the ways in which international retirement migration 
may operate. 
APPENDIX A 
Matlab Codes 
In this appendix we are going to provide all the codes used to evaluate the 
results of the third part of this thesis 
1. The Long run Steady State before and after any change 
1.1. Two period model. These files simulate the steady state in section 3.1 
with respect to Table 1 and 2 
1.1.1. File master. Ly=0.8; 
Lo=0.5; 
K=1.15; 
Kguess=1; 
Nguess=0.1; 
N=2; 
parameter 
%set all parameter 
while K>1.011*Kguess I K<0.989*Kguess I N>1.011*Nguessi N<0.989*Nguess 
if K>1.01*Kguess 
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K=0.99*K; 
end 
if K<0.99*Kguess 
K=1.001*K; 
end 
if N>1.01*Nguess 
Ly=0.999*Ly; 
end 
if N<0.99*Nguess 
Ly=1.001*Ly; 
end 
%calculate N as average of Eo Ey Ly Lo 
N=Ey* (1-Ly) +Eo* (1-Lo); 
%N=2-Ly-Lo; 
% income, interest rate and wage 
production 
%consumption and leisure guessing 
consumptionleisure 
agregation 
P=[K, R, W, Ly, Lo]; 
end 
con_leysur; 
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1.1.2. Subprograms. . 
1. Parameters; this sets the parameters 
%parameter 
% production function constant A 
A=2.4753; 
Eo=1; 
Ey=1; 
alpha=1.5; 
rho=0.8; 
gamma=0.2; 
% intensity of use of capital epsilon 
e=0.25; 
delta=0.015; 
2. Production; this sets the value of the production function 
Y=A*(K"e)*(N"(1-e)); 
R=A*K" (-1+e) *e*N" (1-e); 
W=A*K"e*N" (-e)*(1-e); 
prod=[Y, R, W]; 
prod. Y=Y; 
prod. R=R; 
prod. W=W; 
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3. consumptionleisure; this calculate a vector of consumption and Leisure for 
young and old. 
%consumption and leisure guessing 
%tempt 
mu=O; 
%soltion for young people in period one 
Ry=prod. R; 
Wy=prod. W; 
Ro=prod. R; 
Wo=prod. W; 
%sistem 
AA=zeros(4); 
AA(1,1)=(Wy*Ey/alpha) "(-rho); 
AA(1,2)=-1; 
AA(2,3)=((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha)"(-rho); 
AA(2,4)=-1; 
AA(3,1)=-1; 
AA(3,3)=((1+Ro) /(1+delta)) -(-gamma)* [[1+alpha^rho* (\Vy*Ey) "(1-rho)] " ((rho- 
gamma) /(1-rho))/ 
([1+alpha^ rho* (Wo*Eo+mu) ^ (1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma)/(1-rho)) )]; 
AA(4,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AA(4,2)=1/(1+Ry)*Wy*Ey* [1]; 
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AA(4,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*[1]; 
AA(4,4)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*Wo*Eo*[1]; 
bb(4,1)=(Wo*Eo+Wy*Ey+Wy*Ey*Ro)/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro); 
x=inv(AA)*bb; 
Cy=x(1,1); 
Ly=x(2,1); 
Co=x(3,1); 
Lo=x(4,1); 
' Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con_leysur=[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
% retirement constrain 
if Lo>=1 
Lo=1; 
mu=0.01; 
AB=zeros (3); 
AB(1,1)=(Wy*Ey/alpha) -(-rho); 
AB(1,2)=-1; 
AB(2,3)=((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha) -(-rho); 
AB(3,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AB(3,2)=1/(1+Ry)*Wy*Ey* [1]; 
AB(3,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)* [1]; 
ab=zeros(3,1); 
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ab(2,1)=1; 
ab(3,1)=(Wo*Eo+Wy*Ey+Wy*Ey*Ro)/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)-1/ 
(1 +Ry) / (1+Ro) * Wo* Eo* [1]; 
y=inv(AB)*ab; 
Y; 
cy=y(1,1); 
Ly=y(2,1); 
Co=y(3,1); 
' Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con_leysur=[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
while Cy >((1+Ro)/(1+delta))"(-gamma)* 
[[1+alpha^rho* (Wy*Ey) ^ (1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma) /(1-rho))/ 
([1 +alpha^ rho* (Wo*Eo+mu) ^ (1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma)/(1-rho)))] *Co 
mu=mu* 1.01; 
AB=zeros (3); 
AB(1,1)=(Wy*Ey/alpha) ^ (-rho); 
AB(1,2)=-1; 
AB(2,3)=((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha) ^ (-rho); 
AB(3,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AB(3,2)=1/(1+Ry)*Wy*Ey*[1]; 
AB(3,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*[1]; 
ab=zeros(3,1); 
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ab(2,1)=1; 
ab(3,1)=(Wo*Eo+Wy*Ey+Wy*Ey*Ro)/(1+Ry)/ 
(1+Ro)-1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*Wo*Eo* [1]; 
y=inv(AB) *ab; 
y; 
Cy=y(1,1); 
Ly=y(2,1); 
Co=y(3,1); 
end 
Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con _ 
leysur= [Cy, Ly, Co, Lo] ; 
end 
Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con 
_leysur= 
[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
4. agregation; as figure 1 
%agregation of N 
Nguess=Ey* (1-Ly) +Eo* (1-Lo); 
%agregation of kapital 
Kguess=Wy*Ey* (1-Ly)-Cy; 
5. cange in young old productivity 
%some experiments on E 
clear all 
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parameter 
jx=O; 
for Ey=1: 0.5: 4 
jx=jx+1; 
twoperiodmodel2 
con_leysur(1,5)=K; 
gra (j x, :) =con _ 
leysur; 
end 
%plot (gra, 'DisplayName', 'gra', 'YDataSource', 'gra'); figure(gcf) 
2. Solving the trasition path 
This file simulate the transition path in part 3, section 3 
2.0.3. File master. . 
%dynamic 20 period ajustment 
clear all 
%steady syate before change 
parameter 
consumptionleisureSS 
SSvalueante 
%steady state after change 
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%input here the change in the sistem 
%change in young productivity 
Ey=3; 
consumptionleisureSS 
SSvaluepost 
%vector of K and N linear approximation 
%change in K 
DeltaK=(SSpost. K-SSante. K)/20; 
DeltaN=(SSpost. N-SSante. N)/20; 
K=SSante. K-DeltaK; 
N=SSante. N-DeltaN; 
for i=1: 21 
K=K+DeltaK; 
factor(i, 1)=K; 
N=N+DeltaN; 
factor(i, 2)=N; 
end 
for p=1: 100 
%vector consumption-leisure for generation 
for i=1: 21 
% production function 
K=factor(i, 1); 
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N=factor(i, 2); 
production 
factor(i, 3)=R; 
factor(i, 4)=W; 
factor(i, 5)=Y; 
kapitalevolution (i, l) =K; 
Labourevolution (i, l) =N; 
end 
for i=1: 20 
%consumption leisure 
Ry=factor(i, 3); 
Ro=factor(i+1,3); 
Wy=factor(i, 4); 
Wo=factor(i+1,4); 
consumptionleisuredy 
consleisure (i, :) =con_leysur; 
consleisure (21, :) =con _ 
leysur; 
end 
%agregation 
for i=1: 20 
%kapital 6 
factor(1,6)=SSante. K; 
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factor(i+1,6) =factor(i, 4) *Ey* (1-consleisure(i, 2))-consleisure(i, 1); 
factor(21,6) =SSpost. K; 
%Labour 7 
factor(1,7)=SSante. N; 
factor(i+1,7)=Ey* (1-consleisure(i+1,2))+Eo* (1-consleisure(i, 4) ); 
factor(21,7)=SSpost. N; 
kapitalevolution (i, p+1) =factor (i, 6); 
kapitalevolution(21, p+1)=SSpost. K; 
Labourevolution(i, p+1) =factor (i, 7); 
Labourevolution(21, p+1)=SSpost. N; 
end 
factor (:, 1)=factor (:, 6); 
factor (:, 2)=factor(:, 7); 
end 
plot (kapitalevolution, 'DisplayName', 'kapitalevolution', 'YDataSource', 'kapi- 
talevolution'); figure(gcf) 
3. Social security 
This file simulate the transition path in part 3, section 4 
3.1. File master. 
%clear all 
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Ly=0.8; 
Lo=0.5; 
K=1.15; 
Kguess=l; 
Nguess=0.1; 
N=2; 
parameter 
%set all parameter 
while K>1.011*Kguess ( K<0.989*Kguess N>1.011*Nguessl N<0.989*Nguess 
if K>1.01*Kguess 
K=0.99*K; 
end 
if K<0.99*Kguess 
K=1.001*K; 
end 
if N>1.01*Nguess 
Ly=0.999*Ly; 
end 
if N<0.99*Nguess 
Ly=1.001*Ly; 
end 
%calculate N as average of Eo Ey Ly Lo 
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N=Ey* (1-Ly) +Eo* (1-Lo); 
%N=2-Ly-Lo; 
% income, interest rate and wage 
production 
%consumption and leisure guessing 
consumptionleisure 
agregation 
P=[K, R, W, Ly, Lo]; 
end 
con_leysur; 
%welfare analisis 
U=-[(Cy"(1-1/rho)+alpha*(Ly)"(1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gamma-1)/(rho-1)/gamma)+1/(1+dclta) 
(Co)"(1-1/rho)+(alpha*(Lo)"(1-1/rho))"(rho*(gamma-1)/(rho-1)/gamma) /(1- 
1/gamma) 
3.1.1. Subprograms. . 
1. consumptionleisure; this calculate a vector of consumption and Leisure for 
young and old with social security 
%parameter 
%consumption and leisure guessing 
%tempt 
mu=O; 
%soltion for young people in period one 
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Ry=prod. R; 
Wy=prod. W; 
Ro=prod. R; 
Wo=prod. W; 
%sistem 
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AA=zeros(4); 
AA (1,1) = (Wy* Ey/alpha) -(-rho); 
AA(1,2)=-1; 
AA(2,3) =((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha) ^(-rho); 
AA(2,4)=-l; 
AA(3,1)=-1; 
AA(3,3)=((1+Ro)/(1+delta)) -(-gamma)* [[l+alpha^rho* (Wy*Ey) ^ (1-rho)] 
^ ((rho-gamma) / (1-rho))/([1+alpha^ rho* (Wo*Eo+mu) ^ (1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma)/(1. 
rho)))]; 
AA(4,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AA(4,2)=1/(1+Ry)*Wy*Ey*[1]; 
AA(4,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*[1]; 
AA(4,4)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*Wo*Eo*[1]; 
bb (4,1) = (Wo * Eo+Wy * Ey+Wy* Ey * Ro-B * Ro) / (1 +Ry) / (l+Ro) ; 
x=inv(AA)*bb; 
Cy=x(1,1); 
Ly=x(2,1); 
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Co=x(3,1); 
Lo=x(4,1); 
Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con 
_leysur= 
[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
% retirement constrain 
if Lo>=1 
Lo=1; 
mu=0.01; 
AB=zeros (3); 
AB(1,1)=(Wy*Ey/alpha) ^(-rho); 
AB(1,2)=-1; 
AB(2,3) =((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha) -(-rho); 
AB(3,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AB(3,2)=1/(1+Ry)*Wy*Ey*[1]; 
AB(3,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*(1]; 
ab=zeros(3,1); 
ab(2,1)=1; 
ab(3,1)=(Wy*Ey+Wy*Ey*Ro-B*Ro+Wo*Eo)/(1+Ry)/ 
(1+Ro)-1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*Wo*Eo* [1]; 
y=inv(AB) *ab; 
Y; 
Cy=y(1,1); 
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Ly=y(2,1); 
Co=y(3,1); 
' Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con_leysur=[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
while Cy >((1+Ro)/(1+delta))"(-gamma)* 
[[1+alpha"rho* (Wy*Ey)"(1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma)/(1-rho))/ 
([1+alpha^rho* (Wo*Eo+mu) " (1-rho)] ^ ((rho-gamma)/(1-rho))) *Co 
mu=mu*1.01; 
AB=zeros (3); 
AB (1,1) =(Wy*Ey/alpha) ^ (-rho); 
AB(1,2)=-1; 
AB (2,3)= ((Wo*Eo+mu)/alpha) " (-rho); 
AB(3,1)=1/(1+Ry); 
AB (3,2)=1/(1+Ry) *Wy*Ey* [1]; 
AB(3,3)=1/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*[1]; 
ab=zeros(3,1); 
ab(2,1)=1; 
ab(3,1)=(Wy*Ey+Wy*Ey*Ro-B*Ro+Wo*Eo)/(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)-1/ 
(1+Ry)/(1+Ro)*Wo*Eo*[1]; 
y=inv(AB)*ab; 
y; 
Cy=y(1,1); 
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Ly=y(2,1); 
Co=y(3,1); 
end 
' Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con _ 
leys ur= [Cy, Ly, Co, Lo] ; 
end 
Cy Ly Co Lo'; 
con_leysur=[Cy, Ly, Co, Lo]; 
2. this evaluate the dynamic of the model with social security changing over 
time 
%dynamic 20 period ajustment 
clear all 
%steady syate before change 
parameter 
%social security parameter 
B=O; 
twoperiodmodelSS 
SSvalueante 
%steady state after change 
%input here the change in the sistem 
%change in young productivity 
B= 0.3; , 
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twoperiodmodelSS 
SSvaluepost 
%dynamic social security 
for t=1: 20 
if t==1 
Bt(t, l)=o; 
end 
if t>1 & t<11 
Bt(t, 1)=(0.03)*(1.292)"(t-2); 
end 
if t>9 & t<20 
Bt(t, 1)=0.3; 
end 
Bt(20,1)=O; 
if t>11 
Bt(t, 1)=0.3; 
end 
end 
%vector of K and N linear approximation 
%change in K 
DeltaK=(SSpost. K-SSante. K)/20; 
DeltaN=(SSpost. N-SSante. N)/20; 
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K=SSante. K-DeltaK; 
N=SSante. N-DeltaN; 
for i=1: 21 
K=K+DeltaK; 
factor(i, 1)=K; 
N=N+DeltaN; 
factor(i, 2)=N; 
end 
for p=1: 100 
%vector consumption-leisure for generation 
factor(1,1)=SSante. K; 
factor (20,1) =SSpost. K; 
factor(21,1)=SSpost. K; 
for i=1: 21 
% production function per period 
K=factor(i, l); 
N=factor(i, 2); 
production 
factor(i, 3)=R; 
factor(i, 4)=W; 
factor(i, 5)=Y; 
kapitalevolution(i, 1)=K; 
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Labourevolution(i, 1)=N; 
end 
for i=2: 20 
%consumption leisure 
Ry=factor(i-1,3); 
Ro=factor(i, 3); 
Wy=factor(i-1,4); 
Wo=factor(i, 4); 
B=Bt(i, l); 
consumptionleisuredy 
consleisure(i,: ) =con_leysur; 
end 
%conumption leisure first generation SS and last generation 
consleisure (1, :) =S S ante. CL; 
consleisure(21,: )=SSpost. CL; 
%agregation 
for i=2: 20 
B=Bt(i, l); 
%kapital 6 
factor(1,6)=SSante. K; 
factor(i, 6) =factor(i-1,4) *Ey* (1-consleisure(i, 2))-consleisure(i, l)-B; 
factor(20,6)=SSpost. K; %Labour 7 
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factor(1,7) =Ey* (1-conleisure(2,2)) +Eo* (1-SSante. Lo); 
factor(i, 7)=Ey* (1-conleisure(i+1,2))+Eo* (1-consleisure(i, 4)); 
factor (21,7) =SSpost. N; 
kapitalevolution(i, p+1)=factor(i, 6); 
kapit alevolut ion (21, p+1) =S Sp os t. K; 
Labourevolution(i, p+1) =factor(i, 7); 
Labourevolution (21, p+1) =SSpost. N; 
kapitalevolution(1, p+l)=SSante. K; 
Lab ourevol ut ion (1, p+ 1) =S S ant e. N; 
end 
factor (:, 1)=factor(:, 6); 
factor (:, 2)=factor(:, 7); 
end 
plot (kapitalevolution, 'DisplayName', 'kapitalevolution', 'YDataSource', 
'kapitalevolution'); figure(gcf) 
%welfare analisys 
for i=2: 20 
U(i+1,1)=1/(1-1/gamma) * [((consleisure(i, 1)) " (1-1/rho) +alpha* (consleisure(i, 2)) " (1- 
1/rho))" 
(rho* (gamma-1) /(rho- 1) /gamma)+ 1/ (1 +delta)* ((consleisure(i, 3)) "(1-1/rho)+alpha* 
(consleisure(i, 4)) " (1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gamma, 1) / (rho- 1) /gamma); 
N 
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end 
U(1,1)=1/(1-1/gamma)*[(SSante. Cy" (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSante. Ly"(1-1/rho)) 
(rho* (gamma-1)/(rho-1)/gamma)+1/(1+delta) * ((SSante. Co) " 
(1-1/rho)+alpha*SSante. Lo^ (1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gamma-1)/(rho- 1) /gamma); 
U(2,1) =1/ (1-1 /gamma)*[ (SSante. Cy" (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSante. Ly" (1-1/rho)) 
- ^(rho*(gamma-1)/(rho-l)/gamma)+1/(l+delta)*((0.03+SSante. Co)"(1- 
1/rho)+ 
alpha*SSante. Lo"(1-1/rho))"(rho*(gamma-1)/(rho- 1) /gamma) ; %U(21,1)=1/(1- 
1/gamma) * 
[(SSpost. Cy"(1-1/rho)+alpha*SSpost. Ly" (1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gammar 1) / (rho- 
1)/gamma)+1/(1+delta) 
*(SSpost. Co" (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSpost. Lo"(1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gamma-1)/(rho- 
1)/gamma)]; 
4. International Retirement Migration 
4.1. File master. This file has been use to find the results of chapter 7 
%dynamic 20 period ajustment I 
clear all 
%steady syate before change love 
parameter 
%social security parameter almina 
B=0.2; 
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theta=O; 
Kstar=0; 
twoperiodmodelSS 
SSvalueante 
%steady state after change 
%input here the change in the system 
%change in young productivity 
B=0.2; 
theta=O; 
Kstar=0.1162;; 
twoperiodmodelSS 
SSvaluepost 
%change in K 
DeltaK=(SSpost. K-SSante. K)/20; 
DeltaN=(SSpost. N-SSante. N)/20; 
K=SSante. K-DeltaK; 
N=SSante. N-DeltaN; 
for i=1: 21 
K=K+DeltaK; 
factor(i, 1)=K; 
N=N+DeltaN; 
factor(i, 2)=N; 
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end 
for p=1: 100 
%vector consumption-leisure for generation 
factor(1,1)=SSante. K; 
factor(20,1) =SSpost. K; 
factor(21,1)=SSpost. K; 
for i=1: 21 
% production function per period 
K=factor(i, 1); 
N=factor(i, 2); 
production 
factor(i, 3)=R; 
factor(i, 4)=W; 
factor(i, 5)=Y; 
kapitalevolution(i, 1)=K; 
Labourevolution(i, l)=N; 
end 
for i=2: 20 
%consumption leisure 
Ry=factor(i-1,3); 
Ro=factor(i, 3); 
Wy=factor(i-1,4); 
i 
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Wo=factor(i, 4); 
%B=Bt(i, l); 
consumptionleisuredy 
consleisure(i,: ) =con_leysur; 
%conumption leisure first generation SS and last generation 
consleisure(1,: )=SSante. CL; 
consleisure (21,: ) =S Spost. CL; 
end . 
%aggregation 
for i=2: 20 
%B=Bt(i, 1); 
%kapital 6 
factor (1,6) =SS ante. K; 
factor(i, 6)=factor(i-1,4) *Ey* (1-consleisure(i, 2))-consleisure(i, 1)-B+Kstar; 
factor(20,6)=SSpost. K; 
%Labour 7 
factor(1,7) =Ey* (1-consleisure(2,2))+Eo* (1-SSante. Lo); 
factor(i, 7) =Ey* (1-consleisure(i+1,2))+Eo* (1-consleisure(i, 4) ); 
factor(21,7)=SSpost. N; 
kapitalevolution (i, p+1) =factor (i, 6); 
kapitalevolution(21, p+1) =SSpost. K; 
Labourevolution(i, p+1) =factor(i, 7); 
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Labourevolution (21, p+1) =SSpost. N; 
kapitalevolution(l, p+l)=SSante. K; 
Labourevolution (1, p+1) =SS ante. N; 
end 
factor (:, 1)=factor(:, 6); 
factor (:, 2)=factor(:, 7); 
end 
plot (kapitalevolution, 'DisplayName', 'kapitalevolution', 
YDataSource', 'kapitalevolution'); figure(gcf) 
%plot (kapitalevolution(1: 21,101), 'DisplayName', I 
'kapitalevolution(1: 21,101)', 'YDataSource', 'kapitalevolution(1: 21,101)'); fig- 
ure(gcf) 
% 
%welfare analisys 
for i=1: 21 
U(i, 1)=1/(1-1/gamma) * [((consleisure(i, l)) " (1- 1 /rho) +alpha* (consleisure(i, 2)) " (1- 
1/rho)) " 
(rho* (gamma-1) /(rho- 1) /gamma) + 1/ (1 +delta)* ((consleisure(i, 3)) " (1-1/rho) +alpha* 
(consleisure(i, 4)) "(1-1/rho)) -(rho* (gamma-1)/ (rho- 1) /gamma)]; 
end 
U(1,1)=1/(1-1/gamma) * [(SSante. Cy"(1-1/rho)+alpha*SSante. Ly" (1-1/rho)) " 
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(rho* (gamma-1) / (rho- 1)/gamma)+1/(1+delta) * ((SSante. Co) " (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSante. Lo" (1- 
1/rho)) 
"(rho* (gamma, 1)/(rho-1)/gamma)]; 
U(21,1)=1/(1-1/gamma)* [(SSpost. Cy" (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSpost. Ly" (1-1/rho)) " (rho* (gamma- 
1) 
/(rho- 1) /gamma)+ 1/ (1+delta) * ((SSpost. Co) " (1-1/rho)+alpha*SSpost. Lo" (1- 
1/rho)) 
-(rho* (gammal) /(rho-l)/gamma)]; 
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